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ABSTRACT

THE LOUISIANA EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (LEAP): A
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S
HIGH STAKES TESTING POLICY
by
Erica L. DeCuir

High stakes testing is popularly examined in educational research, but
contemporary analyses tend to reflect a qualitative or quantitative research design (e.g.,
Au, 2007; Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2006; Gamble, 2010). Exhaustive debate over the
relative success or failure of high stakes testing is often framed between competing
visions of epistemological constructs, and the historical foundations of high stakes testing
policies are rarely explored. The origins of high stakes testing can be traced to local
school reform efforts in states like Louisiana, and investigating the roots of high stakes
testing at the state level contextualizes the national debate on student assessment in
research and scholarship.
Using historical research methods, this project details the local campaign to
implement the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as Louisiana’s
comprehensive high stakes testing program. Enacted under state law in 1986, the LEAP
is a series of K-12 student assessments aligned to prescriptive state standards. The LEAP
is among the nation’s longest comprehensive high stakes testing programs and is the
centerpiece to Louisiana’s school accountability system. The narrative of its
development offers critical insight into the overarching rationales for high stakes testing
that continue to drive accountability policies throughout the country. This study

interweaves sociological and political history into a singular chronological record of the
LEAP. Historical research methodology informs this study by establishing the basis for
data collection and analysis. Historical research method is the systematic collection and
evaluation of primary source data in order to determine trends, causes, or effects of past
events (Gay, 1996; Lucey, 1984). Methods used in this research investigation include
document analysis and oral history interviews. Multiple data sources are used to gain a
thorough understanding of the historical context surrounding the implementation of the
LEAP. The LEAP functions as both a student assessment program and policy of school
accountability, and the story of its development is an important narrative within the field
of high stakes testing research and scholarship.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Defining the Problem
Educational researchers have devoted extensive study to the applications, effects,
and implications of high stakes testing. Many researchers criticize high stakes testing for
narrowing curriculum and imposing “drill and kill” methods in classroom practice (e.g.,
Au, 2007; Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2006; Kozol, 2006; McNeil, 2001; Ravitch, 2010).
Surveys of K-12 teacher perceptions are consistent with the findings in this line of
research, and they often indicate teachers’ contradictory views toward high stakes
assessments (Abrams, Pedulla, & Madaus, 2003; Jones & Egley, 2006; Wellman, 2007),
despite the tests’ strong influence on instructional decisions (Faulkner & Cook, 2006;
White, Sturtevant & Dunlap, 2003). By contrast, those researching positive trends in
student test scores found evidence of increased academic performance for racial
minorities (Roach, 2006) and lower-income students (Flesche, 2008; Winters, 2008). In
respect to the legitimacy of high stakes testing as authentic models of student assessment,
researchers have also examined issues of validity and reliability (Hattie, Jaeger, & Bond,
1999; Moss, 1994; Popham, 2008).
Prior research on high stakes testing tends to reflect a methodological approach
consistent with either a qualitative or quantitative design. Exhaustive debate over the
relative success or failure of high stakes testing is often framed between competing
visions of epistemological and theoretical constructs, and the historical foundations of
high stakes testing policies are rarely explored. Few research studies ask the critical and

2

overarching questions such as: Why is high stakes testing popularly regarded as a valid
assessment of student learning and policy of school accountability? Where did high
stakes testing originate and what are the lasting implications of its development? Who
were instrumental in campaigning for high stakes testing and why did they support it?
High stakes testing continues a very long tradition of standards-based curricula and
testing in the United States, but the most immediate origins of this national movement
can be traced to local school reform efforts in states like Texas, Louisiana, and Florida.
The philosophy and rationale underlying high stakes testing took root within these states,
and uncovering the foundations of high stakes testing at the state level contextualizes the
national debate on student assessment in research and scholarship.

Overview of the Study
Using historical research methodology, I examine how and why the LEAP was
established as a high stakes testing program in Louisiana’s public schools. The LEAP
program was first enacted under state law in 1986 and included an assortment of K-12
assessments aligned to prescriptive state standards. The law required local school
systems to use the LEAP K-8 assessments as a principal criterion in promotional
decisions, but local school officials retained final authority in student promotion.
Successful scores on the LEAP eleventh grade test, called the graduate exit exam (GEE),
were required to receive a high school diploma in public schools throughout the state.
The LEAP was redesigned under state law in 1999 as Leap for the 21st Century (LEAP
21), and it became the centerpiece to the state’s new school accountability system. The
LEAP 21 program introduced more rigorous testing and increased the stakes associated
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with student failure. All fourth and eighth graders who failed the LEAP 21 tests were
automatically retained regardless of classroom performance or teacher recommendations
for promotion. Schools and school districts with a high number of student failures faced
financial sanctions or even state takeover. In this dissertation study, I identify key actors
and significant events that contributed to the development and implementation of the
LEAP. I also explore popular rationales that supported the LEAP as a valid assessment
of student learning and policy of school accountability. Finally, I examine the
implications of LEAP’s development and the lasting effects on Louisiana students and
communities.
Significance of the Study
Educational reform initiatives at the state level have predictive value for national
educational policy. The Texas accountability system is often regarded as the model for
the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) that authorizes standardized curriculum and
assessment programs in every state (Nelson, McGhee, Meno, & Slater, 2007). In early
2010, the Florida state legislature passed a landmark bill to eliminate tenure for all
beginning teachers and align teacher pay to student performance on standardized tests
(Hafenbrack & Postal, 2010). Although Florida’s governor vetoed the merit pay bill
under intense pressure from educators, national support for merit pay escalated as a result
of the political debate in Florida. Using merit pay to evaluate teacher performance and
salary was later made a criterion for the 2010 Race to the Top federal grant program,
which awarded $4 billion dollars to school districts and states throughout the country
(U.S. Department of Education, 2011). Much is known about Texas and Florida’s school
accountability programs and their potential to impact national education policy, but little
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has been researched on local educational initiatives in Louisiana.
In 2001, Louisiana became the first state to deny student promotion at the fourth
and eighth grade level, and to deny a high school diploma, to those students who failed
the LEAP 21/GEE state assessment (Johnson & Johnson, 2006). Louisiana also imposed
financial sanctions on low-performing schools and school districts as a part of LEAP 21.
In 2004 the nationally-recognized educator magazine, Education Week, awarded
Louisiana its top rating for standards and accountability and distinguished Louisiana’s
accountability-via-assessment policy as an example for others to follow (Skinner, 2004).
In 2005, citing a history of poor LEAP test scores, the Louisiana Legislature voted to
terminate all employees in the New Orleans Parish Schools (NOPS) system following
Hurricane Katrina. Legislators created a hybrid school district in New Orleans consisting
of traditional and charter schools operated by two different school boards: The Orleans
Parish School Board (OPSB) operates about 12 mostly high performing schools in the
city, and the Recovery School District (RSD) operates about 107 mostly low-performing
schools in the city. Charter schools outnumber traditional schools in a ratio of 3:1 in both
districts, and charter schools are managed by a hodgepodge of private companies, private
individuals, and educational management organizations (EMOs). On its website the RSD
states that it promotes “a system of autonomous school districts that are held
accountable” and “business practices to ensure effectiveness and high standards” in
fulfilling the mission for student improvement in struggling schools (Louisiana
Department of Education “The Recovery School District, About the RSD,” 2008). The
hybridization of school districts in governance and operational structure found in New
Orleans (i.e. local vs. state, traditional vs. charter, public vs. private) is a novel idea and
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Louisiana is poised to lead the nation in redefining the operational control of public
schools and the role of local communities within it.
Serious implications arise from using the LEAP to determine student promotion
and graduation, school financing and school quality, and now with the RSD, school
operations and governance. It is essential to identify how and why school accountabilityvia-assessment was adopted in Louisiana to determine the impact of the LEAP in
improving teaching and student learning. An informed understanding of the historical
foundations and rationales used to implement the LEAP contextualizes its relative
success or failure in contemporary discourse on school reform. Before Louisiana
accountability policies can be replicated in other areas around the country, the LEAP
deserves critical historical analysis as a model of student assessment and policy of school
accountability.

Conceptual Framework
Historical research is anchored by the collection and evaluation of primary source
data to formulate historical accounts of the past. It relies on the authenticity of primary
documents to draw inferences and interpretations based on patterns or relationships in
history. Historical researchers “subordinate historical facts to an interpretive framework
within which those facts are given meaning and significance” (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2005,
p. 413). The procedures for conducting historical research are similar to other types of
research paradigms: identify a topic or problem, formulate research questions, collect
data, interpret data, and produce a verbal synthesis of the findings or interpretations (Gay
& Airasian, 2000, p. 226). Garrahan (1946) attaches precision to primary source data
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collection by identifying six levels of inquiry: date, localization, authorship, analysis,
integrity, and credibility. The levels of inquiry constitute external criticism that
eliminates the use of false evidence in historical analysis (Shafer, 1974). They also help
to establish authenticity of collected data. Gay & Airasian (2000) offer four factors in
considering the accuracy of primary documents, or internal criticism. First, the author of
the document should be determined as a competent person knowledgeable about the
event or occurrence under review. Second, the time delay should be noted in evaluating
each data source. An observation or field notes written while the event is occurring
(school board meeting minutes) or shortly after (diaries) are more likely to be accurate
than recollections of those events many years later. Third, the bias and motives of the
author should be considered in establishing the aims, audience, and purpose of the
document. Finally, each piece of evidence should be compared with all others to
determine the degree of agreement or validation (p. 229-230). In synthesizing historical
evidence, the concluding hypothesis must have greater explanatory power for the nature
or course of facts than any competing explanation (McCullagh, 1984).
Historical research is used to construct a perspective from the historical record
that advances or clarifies our understanding of historical foundations and current events.
Primary source collection and interpretation is the core of historical research method
(Grigg, 1991). A conceptual framework of historical research informs this study by
establishing the basis for data collection and analysis. Because the goal of this study is to
determine the foundations of the LEAP, conclusions are derived from the interplay of
historical interpretation and the context of primary source data collected from archival
records and oral history interviews. A historical perspective of the LEAP is made from
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primary source data analysis in both textual and non-textual forms.
Methodology
Historical research method is the systematic collection and evaluation of data
related to past occurrences in order to determine trends, causes, or effects of these events
(Gay, 1996; Lucey, 1984). Methods used in this study include document analysis and
oral history interviews. Document analysis involves collecting and analyzing primary
source data. Data are then evaluated as a credible source and used to draw inferences or
assumptions directed toward the historian’s ends (Berkhofer, 2008). Objects are
collected and classified into three data categories: physical material versus textual,
written versus other media (film, sound), and personal versus institutional (p. 6-8).
Documents are identified as credible sources by evaluating the relationship between the
source and original activity in the arrangement and preservation of materials (Grigg,
1991, p. 233). Primary source data, whether it is a testimony, photograph, or government
report, is examined through sourcing, inference, and interpretation. Multiple perspectives
of historical events are acknowledged; first-hand accounts are produced with a particular
aim and audience in view (McCullough & Richardson, 2000). Document analysis
answers specific research questions that involve foundations, patterns, and descriptions of
historical events and figures.
Oral history interviews complement document analysis as another method for
obtaining primary source data (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2005). Oral history is used to
supplement, not replace, the documentary record. Oral history is recorded as social
history and measures the impact of larger political and economic events on local
communities and cultures (Sharpless, 2008). Shafer (1974) advanced criteria for
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evaluating eyewitness testimony in oral history interviews. He emphasized the
distinction between real and literal meaning of an author’s statements as well as the
credibility and contradictions of an author’s words. Standardized, open-ended interviews
help to minimize interviewer effects, establish systematic questions for data analysis, and
emphasize focused responses to research questions (Patton, 1990). Interviews are
reviewed a second time using categories developed by the researcher. Oral history
interviews provide a rich illustration of the historical record that complements document
analysis. They serve to recount historical events, provide testimony, explain behavior,
and establish multiple or contrary perspectives for a historical event.
Data Sources and Data Collection Methods
In determining the historical and legislative roots of the LEAP, I collected an
extensive range of data sources. Data sources include official reports from the Louisiana
Department of Education, the State Superintendent of Schools, Louisiana State
Legislature, and Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE);
press releases and minutes from local school board meetings and town hall meetings; and
various court briefings. Academic literature, newspaper journalism, television scripts,
and other media reports are used to supplement government and policy reports.
Published accounts of the LEAP authored by teachers, parents, students, administrators,
policy analysts, and journalists are also examined.
The oral history interviews reveal first-hand accounts from past students and
teachers who were present in Louisiana schools as the LEAP was announced and
implemented. Participants were active in the LEAP debates, witnessed its
implementation in local schools, and are knowledgeable of its effects on teaching and
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learning. Participants were chosen from a list of teachers and students who emerged as
important actors from the LEAP archival data. The list was narrowed by eliminating
deceased individuals, individuals who lacked requisite mental faculties, persons who
declined to take part in the study, and those whose correspondence information could not
be located. A total of six (6) participants were interviewed using Skype video calling or
via the telephone. Each participant was interviewed singularly using a standardized,
open-ended form. Interview transcripts were transcribed and arranged for data analysis.
Data Analysis
First, I collected and arranged archival data into three data categories: physical
material versus textual, written versus other media (film and sound), and personal versus
institutional. Second, I evaluated data to infer the authenticity of each document, the
packaging and location of the document’s source, and the context or perspective of the
document’s source. To perform document analysis, I drew from Garrahan’s (1946) six
levels of inquiry that constitute external criticism. I began by certifying the date,
localization, author, and credibility of each document by collecting the documents from
official depositories of the document’s source. For example, biographies of Louisiana
state senators were received from the archives of the Louisiana Senate, and LEAP test
scores for urban school districts were obtained from press releases of the Louisiana
Department of Education. I confirmed the integrity of the document by researching the
authorship and relationship to the source. The author’s relationship to the source indicates
the legitimacy of the author as a competent person knowledgeable about the information
provided in the document. For example, a summary of Louisiana’s Competency-Based
Act was obtained by the Official Journal of the State and certified in records belonging to
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the official archives of the Louisiana State Congress. To analyze documents from
secondary sources such as The Times Picayune newspaper, I separated editorial opinions
from official reporting on topics such as test scores and election results. Within this
dissertation, I identified newspaper articles as editorial opinions, interviews, or test scores
released by state education officials.
Since my research topic involves a historical event that occurred over three
decades earlier, it is important to outline the data analysis for oral history interviews. To
establish internal criticism, I relied on Gay & Airasian’s (2000) model for establishing
accuracy of primary source information. There is significant time delay between the
1986 creation of the LEAP and the interviews I conducted in 2010. Because of the time
delay, I carefully selected interview participants that were both competent and
knowledgeable about events associated with the LEAP. I narrowed interview data to the
information that directly illustrated important events in the historical record I uncovered
from archival sources. I then compared interview responses included in this dissertation
with all other evidence to determine the degree of validation. I analyzed both the
interview and archival data to establish historical patterns, establish congruence in the
historical record, and obtain verification. Finally, data was arranged so that a historical
account emerges with explanatory power to illustrate a broad conception of the research
focus guiding the study.
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Definition of Terms
Educational policy: a mandate created by a legislative or institutional body that involves
schooling and education
Excellence rationale: a theory of school improvement that promotes a universal standard
of academic excellence in all schools regardless of socioeconomic status
High stakes testing: used interchangeably with high stakes assessments; refers to stateadministered student assessment programs that establish punitive consequences for low
student performance on standardized assessments
Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE): an
administrative, policymaking body for elementary and secondary schools in Louisiana;
BESE supervises school operations and management of public schools in Louisiana
Minimum Foundation Formula: The financing formula set by BESE to determine the
annual costs of school financing in Louisiana; Louisiana Legislature approves the amount
of the Minimum Foundation Program annually and BESE appropriates school funding
accordingly
School accountability: an educational agenda that requires students, parents, teachers,
school and district leaders to accept responsibility for student achievement on
standardized tests through incentives and sanctions
Standards-based reform: an educational agenda that promotes standardized curriculum
and assessments in local schools to raise academic performance on national and
international achievement tests
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Organization of Chapters
The remainder of this dissertation includes four subsequent chapters. In chapter
two, I review the State Supervisory Program as Louisiana’s first standardized curriculum
and assessment program. The Louisiana Department of Education established the State
Supervisory Program in 1921 to promote Anglo-American language and culture
throughout the state. Student achievement testing, though limited to certain schools, was
an important feature of the State Supervisory Program and tied Louisiana to the national
testing movement that gained footing in the early 20th century. In chapter three, I
examine the political and social foundations of high stakes testing in Louisiana and the
excellence rationale that emerged as the founding principles of the LEAP. Together,
chapters two and three provide a chronological overview of educational testing in
Louisiana through state policy action, and serves to contextualize the story of LEAP
within a larger framework of national and state testing practices. In chapter four, I detail
the actions of local political and school leaders to establish the LEAP as a high stakes
testing program. I also review legal challenges to the LEAP graduate exit exam (GEE)
and the dual system of high school graduation requirements that resulted. Key architects
of Louisiana’s accountability system are introduced—former Governor Mike Foster,
former Superintendent Cecil Picard, former BESE member-turned Superintendent Paul
Pastorek, and former BESE member Leslie Jacobs. These political leaders spearheaded
the LEAP for the 21st century Program (LEAP 21) that instituted both rigorous
assessments and stringent accountability policies that define the LEAP program in
present-day Louisiana. I conclude this historical analysis of the LEAP in chapter five by
examining the implications of this high stakes testing policy in Louisiana.
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CHAPTER 2
THE STATE SUPERVISORY PROGRAM: HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
STANDARDIZED CURRICULUM AND ASSESSMENT IN LOUISIANA

In the previous chapter, the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP)
is introduced as a critical high stakes testing policy that warrants meaningful historical
analysis. In this chapter I examine the Louisiana State Supervisory Program as an
antecedent of high stakes testing and the LEAP. In the early 1920s, state leaders
developed the Supervisory Program as an educational policy to promote cultural
assimilation of Louisiana’s heterogeneous population. The State Supervisory Program
emphasized Anglo-American cultural norms through standardized curriculum and
assessment applied unevenly in racially segregated schools. I also situate Louisiana’s
State Supervisory Program within the larger national testing movement in the early 20th
century. Louisiana’s assessment policy differed somewhat from the national testing
movement in terms of its scope, but rationales for the systematic use of standardized
testing in public schools were similar. The national testing movement was advanced by
educational psychologists and grew in popularity because of three reasons:
hereditarianism, scientific experimentation, and social efficiency. Louisiana educational
leaders embraced the State Supervisory Program for those same reasons, but fundamental
values toward public education made Louisiana’s testing program distinct. Louisiana’s
deep roots in French colonialism, Catholicism, and slavery, greatly influenced the scope
of its State Supervisory Program and the unique educational structure that resulted.
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Public Education in Louisiana
Public education in Louisiana has an interesting background story that began in
the early 1800s with its first governor, William C. Claiborne (Hebert, 1999; Noble,
1999). When Claiborne arrived in Louisiana shortly after the transfer of the Louisiana
Purchase, he found a polyglot population of French, African, Native American, and
Spanish blends who were somewhat united in their disdain for the imposed English
government. Schooling followed the traditional French model of private boarding
schools, tutors, and apprenticeships for wealthy and upper-class families, with no
provisions for the common masses. By law it was illegal to teach slaves to read or write,
and thus about two-thirds of the population were forcibly illiterate. The free Black
community received schooling from Catholic institutions and private schools, and their
efforts established the largest literate Black community in the United States prior to the
Civil War (Alberts, 1999). Free Blacks often received education that was both practical
and political; education was secured for the collective advancement of Blacks both
politically and economically (Mitchell, 2000). Small bands of Native Americans also
received some religious and literacy instruction through Catholic monasteries that began
under Spanish rule in Louisiana (Noble, 1999).
For Governor Claiborne, however, public schooling was the key agent to the
Americanization of Louisiana. He was aware of the desperate need to “educate,
indoctrinate, and Americanize a largely foreign, partly hostile population” (Suarez, 1999,
p. 65). He pursued public education as a way to homogenize Louisiana’s eclecticism
under the auspices of American language and culture. He sought legislation for the
provision of public education through general taxation but he was unable to secure the
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support of the powerful Creole elite, whose youth were educated in private Catholic
schools. Discontent soon arose over school financing and the cultural imposition of
Protestantism and the English language. As a result, the movement for public education
languished until 1847 when the Anglo-Saxon population began to outnumber the Creole
population. In 1847 the state legislature passed the first statewide public school law,
which supported the establishment of public schools through general taxation (Hilton,
Shipp, & Gremillion, 1999). Unfortunately, the fledgling school system did not gather
much traction until 1877. The years 1847-1877 were marked by continual disruption
from the Civil War and Reconstruction, when public schools were abandoned due to
financial despair and the absence of educational leadership at the state and local level.
Newly freed Blacks eagerly attended the schools of the Freedmen‘s Bureau during
Reconstruction, but White resentment toward Northern control and integrated facilities
led to a White boycott (p. 144).
Following Reconstruction, Louisiana schools obtained substantial support through
state legislative action and local taxation (Hilton, Shipp, & Gremillion, 1999). The
General School Act of 1877 and the Constitution of 1898 provided for the Louisiana
Department of Education and Louisiana Superintendent of Schools. Soon after, steps
were taken to centralize Louisiana school leadership under the parish and state leaders--as
opposed to local authorities in towns and cities--in the General School Acts of 1912 and
1916. Together, these legislative acts authorized the Louisiana Department of Education
to maintain the general supervision of school operations and financial appropriations.
However, a particular emphasis of the Louisiana Department of Education was in
creating uniform standards for curriculum, graduation, and student assessment.
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Standardizing Curriculum and Instruction
Similar to other states in the Deep South, White Louisiana residents maintained
deep-seated beliefs of White supremacy and Black subservience well after the federal
constitutional ban on slavery. These beliefs resonated sharply within the educational
system and were a central factor in the dual system of racially segregated schools that
later emerged. The earliest activities of the Louisiana Department of Education
(henceforth called the LDE) included consolidating local control, establishing institutes
for teacher training, supervising instruction and curriculum development, and certifying
high school diplomas (Alexander, 1940; Ives, 1999). Teacher training institutes began in
the mid-1880s under direction of the Peabody Board. In 1899, then-State Superintendent
Joseph A. Breaux “decried the lack of uniformity in the whole educational movement”
and sought to manage teacher training and certification (Alexander, 1940, p. 10). State
legislators soon gave authority to the LDE to conduct one-week summer training
institutes for White teachers on a voluntary basis (although, teachers who did not attend
forfeited one day’s pay). The training institutes followed a prescribed schedule of
instruction that targeted subject matter and methods. The institutes also imposed a list of
basic ideas that emphasized the practical nature of schooling and the role of education in
increasing “efficiency in all of the activities of life” (p. 17).
The LDE consolidated local control by merging White one-room schools into
single parish schools and placing the appointment of parish school supervisors under their
authority (Alexander, 1940; Rogers, 1936). The parish supervisor’s role was to oversee
instruction within the parish schools and evaluate whether certain standards were met in
the elementary, junior high, and high school classrooms. In doing so, there was some
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semblance of curriculum sequencing that provided for seamless transition between grade
levels. The parish supervisors often created evaluation guides that were distributed to
teachers in advance of classroom visits. For example, in 1923 the high school supervisor
distributed a chart of nine teaching techniques in an attempt to promote their standard use
in high schools (Alexander, 1940, p. 49). According to the 1929 manual, Louisiana High
School Standards, Organization, and Administration, principals were urged to make no
changes in the subjects offered or curriculum sequence (p. 51). The course of study for
the high school included an emphasis on practical and agricultural courses alongside
studies in English, American and Louisiana history.
Keeping in line with the fervor to develop uniform curricula and sequencing in
the White system of schooling, great care was made to develop a standard course of study
for Black schools. Black education was viewed suspiciously by many White Louisiana
residents, especially White planters who relied on Black sharecropping labor to finance
local economies. Only through public campaigns by John D. Rockefeller’s General
Education Board and the LDE to reassure White communities about the “special”
curriculum for Blacks, did White attitudes change. In a 1918 bulletin entitled, “Aims and
Needs of the Negro Public Education in Louisiana,” the LDE stated the curriculum for
Blacks would teach students how to perform duties “the world wants done” (Chujo, 1999,
p. 310). Curriculum in both the elementary and secondary schools stressed agriculture,
home economics, and limited literacy instruction. For Black elementary students, school
terms were shortened to correspond with the planting season. The first four terms offered
basic literacy instruction, the following four terms concentrated on American and
Louisiana history, geography, and hygiene, and the last two terms focused on industrial
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arts such as cooking and canning. Curriculum at the high school level almost exclusively
stressed general and industrial education. The first two years offered courses on English
language, American and Louisiana history, and industrial science. The last two years
offered courses in manual trades and teacher training. Of the high school courses, a Black
teacher in Caddo Parish concluded: “They want us to teach the children such things as
shoe shining, waiting tables and….maid service” (as quoted in Johnson, 1997, p. 149).
Louisiana had the distinction of being the only state in the county to differentiate
a separate, yet standardized curriculum exclusively for Blacks (Chujo, 1999, p. 310). A
dual system of racially segregated schools maintained the color line entrenched during
Louisiana’s colonial years, and the curricular emphasis on English language, history, and
culture reflects the continuous attempt to Americanize Louisiana’s diverse population.
However, the concern for standardization, industrial education, and practical living tied
Louisiana to the larger Industrial Revolution dominating the nation. The State
Supervisory Program embraced Industrial-era values but maintained Louisiana’s
traditional views on race, schooling and society reflected in its colonial history.

The State Supervisory Program (1920-1934)
Legendary state school superintendent, T.H. Harris, who served from 1908 -1940,
is credited for the high degree of centralization in the Louisiana school system (Rogers,
1936). Even more influential than legislative action, Harris sought a strong state
educational system and enlisted the cooperation of business, political, and professional
groups to achieve that goal. For Harris, the most important function of the state
department was classroom supervision (Alexander, 1940, p. 49) and he began the State
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Supervisory Program as a comprehensive program to promote uniform standards in
curriculum, instruction, and assessment. State testing was initiated by the high school
supervisor as early as 1910, who prepared mid-semester tests in the state office and
forwarded them to principals, who in turn were required to issue and report test results (p.
52). In 1917 the first standardized achievement tests, Ayres Spelling Scale, was
administered by Mr. John Foote, assistant to T.H. Harris (Rogers, 1936, p. 26). By the
1920s, an ambitious plan for statewide testing in core subjects for all students was
included as a function of the Supervisory Program.
A state testing program was popularized as early as 1916 and was implemented in
the 1920-1921 school year (Rogers, 1936). A summary of the Supervisory Program for
the 1920-1921 school year indicates that parish supervisors administered commercial
standardized achievement tests in arithmetic, reading, and spelling “to measure the
efficiency of teaching” (p. 30). In 1922 the state education department created its own
statewide test for seventh-graders to assess student achievement, and by the 1929-1930
school year the state education department began preparing statewide benchmark tests in
arithmetic every six weeks for grades two to seven (p. 33). In subsequent years, the
statewide testing program was expanded so that a benchmark test for each subject was
prepared for each grade (Alexander, 1940, p. 52). Benchmark tests were aligned to the
standards set by the Louisiana Department of Education for approved elementary and
secondary schools. Curriculum guides were provided for content and sequencing in each
six-week period for reading, writing, and arithmetic. Participation in the statewide testing
program was voluntary, but department officials actively sought school participation and
test results were tabulated and announced by state department workers (Alexander, 1940,
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p. 52). The tests were used to assess and monitor student achievement of curriculum
standards set by the Louisiana Department of Education, but did not impact student
promotion, school operations, or school funding. Subjects were tested randomly each
six-week period, and schools were not apprised which subjects would be tested. In doing
so, the Louisiana Department of Education sought to enforce its curriculum
recommendations for scope and sequence:
The first grade will not be given a test during the first six weeks. After that a test
in reading will be given after the course of each six-week period. In other grades,
a test will be prepared in one subject each period. No announcement will be made
as to what subject or subjects will be selected for the test in any period. Each test
will be based on the textbooks of the latest adoption and the limits of the test will
be confined to subject matter outlined for the six-week period. (Rogers, 1936, p.
52)
Not all of the test scores received would be included in the official test averages for
Louisiana. The Louisiana Department of Education made determinations about which
schools would be included in the state average and those that would be excluded, but no
criteria are listed about how department supervisors made their decisions. Also, scores
were not distributed statewide nor available for comparison and ranking; parishes could
only obtain copies of their students’ test scores (Alexander, 1940; Rogers, 1936).
The centralization and uniformity of Louisiana public schools had been achieved
through the efforts of the Louisiana Department of Education by 1930. The department
approved a set of standards for both the elementary and secondary level and certified
graduates from schools that adhered to the set standards. Parish and local supervisors
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enforced uniform standards in curriculum, teaching, and assessment through the use of
standard evaluations, teaching guides, and assessments. The statewide testing program,
however, was later abandoned by the Louisiana Department of Education as an integral
feature of its Supervisory Program. Statewide testing in the high school was discontinued
in 1933 and later ended in the elementary schools in 1934. Reports from the State
Superintendent attributed the discontinuation of the testing program to a lack of state
funding, but Rogers (1936) speculated that the exact checking of curriculum progress was
also a factor. Alexander (1940) suggested that the standards and accompanying tests
were too narrow and definite, and needed to be developed in cooperation with teachers
and students. There is some indication that the department officials also thought the
standards were too rigid. Standards applied in approving elementary schools in the 19381939 school term emphasized a flexible curriculum study under general
recommendations for each grade level. Specifying attainments of academic achievement
through tests and evaluation was made secondary to curriculum study and instructional
development in schools. The Louisiana Department of Education did not abandon its
efforts to engender homogenous and uniform courses of study. Rather, instead of
administering a statewide testing program to assess student achievement of prescribed
curricula, the department shifted its focus to curriculum development in setting standards,
furnishing curriculum materials, teacher training, and direct classroom supervision. At
the close of the 1930s, Alexander (1940) described the state education department as
directive, or one that provided for the “comprehensive curriculum planning and
development involving almost universal organized study” (p. 112). Ives (1999)
concurred, crediting Louisiana’s centralized school system to heavy state financing and
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state legislative action. He concluded his examination of educational leadership in
Louisiana by stating: “Who pays the fiddler calls the tune” (p. 250).
The State Supervisory Program demonstrates a founding principle of strong state
leadership in the promotion of standardized curriculum and assessment. It also illustrates
curriculum differentiation along racial lines, which limited Black schools to only
rudimentary literacy and industrial education. A major reason for this distinction was the
state’s dependence on Black sharecropping labor to support the traditional agricultural
economy. Standardized curriculum and assessment policies institutionalized unequal
curriculum tracts between Blacks and Whites, which extended to school financing and
facilities as well. In doing so, Black educational achievements lagged sharply behind
Whites and served to perpetuate stereotypes of White intellectual superiority.
Louisiana’s achievement tests were used to promote assimilation and homogeneity as
summative assessments, but nationally, standardized tests were used as diagnostic tools
to place students into differentiated curriculum tracts. The national testing movement
championed Industrial-era values for technology and efficiency to manage public
schools, and to distinguish college-bound students from the factory labor force.

The National Testing Movement and Louisiana
The origins of both intelligence and standardized achievement testing in
American schools can be traced to the scientific discoveries of early 20th century
European psychologists (Galton, 1869; Binet & Simon, 1916; Stern, 1990). American
educational psychologists imported standardization design and test development from
Europe, and refined intelligence and achievement testing for mass production in
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American schools. Boring (1950) described the American branch of psychology as one
which inherited its “physical body from German experimentalism and its mind from
Darwin” (p. 506). In particular, it was the combining of statistical measurement with the
genetic approach to human nature that defined American educational psychology in both
theory and practice during this period. Leaders of American educational psychology—
Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman, Edward Thordike, and Robert Yerkes—all subscribed to
hereditarianism or the belief in social Darwinism. Hereditarianism espoused to a
racialized hierarchy of mental ability to explain social and racial inequities. These
hereditarian views greatly influenced standardized testing designs and their
implementation. Standardization required statistical tools often found in the realm of
natural sciences, which granted intelligence and achievement testing a degree of validity
and credibility within society.
Henry Goddard, an American eugenicist who completed his training in Europe,
administered the first standardized intelligence tests in America in 1913 (Goddard, 1917).
He tested newly arrived immigrants at Ellis Island, and identified nearly 80 percent of
Jewish, Italian, Russian, and Hungarians as mentally retarded. His Ellis Island study
substantiated eugenicists’ cause for deportations and restrictions in federal immigration
policy (Gould, 1981). Lewis Terman, who personified the concept of biological
determinism, revised the 1911 intelligence scale developed by French-born Alfred Binet
and Theodore Simon in 1916 (Terman, 1916). Terman modified the Binet-Simon scale
by adding tests on English vocabulary and fables. He standardized the Binet-Simon scale
using a sample of White, middle-class children in the Stanford University community to
develop norms. Native Americans, Mexicans, and African-Americans were excluded
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from the standardization sample. Terman developed the Stanford-Binet intelligence test
based on his revisions to the Binet scale and results of his standardization sample. Used
as the model for subsequent intelligence tests in the United States (Gould, 1981; Valencia
& Suzuki, 2001), the Stanford-Binet tests were replicated in numerous studies and
continually reported the genetic, mental superiority of Anglo-Europeans (e.g., Garth,
1925; Goodenough, 1926; Shuey, 1958).
Edward Thorndike completed some of the earliest work in standardized
achievement testing (Raftery, 1988). Thorndike’s specialty was the application of
quantitative methodology to the field of learning theory. He sought to eliminate
subjectivity and variability in the assessment of student achievement by designing a
series of achievement tests standardized for teacher administration. The arithmetic test
was introduced in 1908 and later joined by spelling (1910), handwriting and drawing
(1913), reading (1914), and language ability (1916) (Raftery, 1988). Thorndike
developed teacher word lists, dictionaries, and other instructional materials to assist
teachers in improving student performance on the achievement tests. By the close of
1916, a host of standardized achievement tests had been developed and commercially
marketed to schools and school systems (Gray, 1916). Not all of the early achievement
tests were norm-referenced, but they usually involved standard procedures of
administration and scoring.
During World War I, Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman, Edward Thorndike, and
Robert Yerkes collaborated to create a series of intelligence tests for the United States
Army. The army tests were the first mass-produced written tests of intelligence and were
used to classify military placement. Terman, Thorndike, and Yerkes later developed the
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National Intelligence Test (NIT) in 1920 based on their revisions to the army intelligence
tests. Using similar techniques of norming and standardization (the NIT was also
standardized using a sample of Whites only), the NIT was designed to identify
intellectual capacity in schoolchildren as early as the first grade. Terman campaigned for
mass intelligence testing in school systems as a mechanism for classifying students into
differentiated curriculum tracks. For Terman, mass intelligence testing increased school
efficiency because curriculum placement would be determined according to native ability
(Terman, 1916).
Terman’s graduate students led the first system-wide adoption of intelligence
testing and curriculum differentiation in Oakland, California in 1919 (Valencia & Suzuki,
2001). From Oakland, intelligence testing and curriculum differentiation extended to
other school systems around the country. In 1926, the U.S. Department of the Interior
surveyed the use of group intelligence tests and ability grouping at the elementary, junior
high, and high schools levels. Drawing from data in 292 cities, it was reported that 85%
of elementary schools, 70% of junior high schools, and 49% of high schools used
intelligence tests to classify students into homogenous ability groups (as cited in Gould,
1981). By the 1950s, intelligence and achievement testing became institutionalized in
American schools, and in many cases they were a central factor in curriculum placement,
promotion, and graduation as found in Los Angeles (Raftery, 1988), Detroit (Angus &
Mirel, 1993), and Santa Fe (Mondale & Patton, 2001).
Nationally, intelligence and achievement tests were used to aid curriculum
placement and differentiation. Major cities faced rapidly growing, ethnically diverse
student populations that contrasted sharply to the demographics of older and established
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private schools. The tests allowed school officials to place students in homogenous
ability groups that aligned to their educability as indicated by intelligence and
achievement test scores. In Louisiana, race was the distinguishing factor in curriculum
study rather than standardized test scores. However, leading rationales for the systematic
use of testing both nationally and in Louisiana were the same. The three reasons for
systematic use of intelligence and achievement testing were hereditarianism, scientific
experimentation, and social efficiency. Hereditarianism resonated sharply with
commonly-held beliefs in Louisiana because it espoused to the supremacy of AngloAmerican language, history, and culture. Early intelligence and achievement tests were
standardized using norms developed from an almost exclusively all-White, middle-class
sample population (Price, 1934). The tests were heavily marked by language ability,
vocabulary, and behaviors established by the test developer and considered “normal” for
the sample. Testing results repeatedly revealed the superiority of American-born Whites
over foreigners and racial minorities, which fit neatly with Louisiana values for racially
segregated schools and Anglo-American language and culture.
Also, the technological savvy inherent to standardized tests afforded them a
degree of legitimacy both nationally and in Louisiana. For the founder-psychologists, the
integration of statistical methods was vital to the level of rigor needed to advance
educational testing in the mainstream. According to Goodenough (1950), Thorndike
popularized his work in standardized achievement tests as a rigorous application of
quantitative methods. Yerkes also “equated rigor and science with numbers and
quantification,” and believed intelligence testing would propel psychology as an
established science “worthy of financial and institutional support” (Gould, 1981, p. 223).
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In an advertisement for the National Intelligence Tests reprinted by Gould (1981), the
tests were promoted to have undergone “careful analysis by a statistical staff” (p. 208).
The posting also stated that the tests were “simple in application, reliable, and
immediately useful for classifying children in Grades 3 to 8 with respect to intellectual
ability” (p. 208). The psychologists gained legitimacy for intelligence and achievement
testing as an extension of quantitative methodology already found in the natural sciences
and well-established as scientific rigor. The promotion of statistical methods within test
construction and development served as a popular rationale for the system-wide
implementation of intelligence and achievement testing in American schools. Test scores
carried a degree of certitude and public confidence that seemingly assured policymakers
and school leaders of trustworthy results.
Perhaps the strongest rationale for the large-scale implementation of intelligence
and achievement testing in schools was that the tests served to increase social efficiency.
Kliebard (2004) succinctly describes the social efficiency ideal in the early twentieth
century not only as an educational doctrine, but a societal urgency. Social efficiency
reformers sought radical changes in school policy to meet direct social and economic
needs of society. They argued that a classical liberal education lacked direct utility for
large and diverse student populations. Instead, practical and vocational education was
necessary to safeguard American identity and institutions from rapid urbanization and
immigration. Advanced by sociologists John Franklin Bobbitt (1912) and David Snedden
(1919), social efficiency leaders sought to integrate schools more closely within the
fabric of existing and desired social structures. The first mass-produced intelligence tests
created by Terman, Thorndike, and Yerkes for the United States army were premised on
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a “particular conception of the good society and a particular attitude toward the nature of
intelligence” (Spring, 1972, p. 13). The measurement of intelligence was based upon
psychologists’ conception of the good society and the good man (p. 13). Intelligence
tests gained acceptance as a vehicle for curriculum differentiation that prepared students
for their anticipated social roles. In general, the American populace began to see more
value in functional, social education that reduced costs and increased utility. Louisiana
state leaders also valued functional education through their early policies of curriculum
and assessment. The strong emphasis on industrial arts and domestic service signals
intent to prepare students for unskilled labor in Louisiana’s agricultural, manufacturing,
and service industries. The crux of Louisiana’s State Supervisory program was social
education, for the program targeted the socializing force of public schools to advance
Anglo-American social norms and to establish an industrial labor force.
Nationwide, intelligence and achievement testing gained footing because the tests
exemplified popular values of the Industrial era—hereditarianism, scientific technology,
and social efficiency. However, criticism of hereditarianism and high costs threatened
educational testing following the Great Depression. In Louisiana, high costs contributed
to the dissolution of the State Supervisory Program, but the tests’ strict adherence to
Anglo-American language and cultural norms were also a factor in its discontinuation.
Louisiana’s large Catholic communities rebelled against standardized curriculum and
assessment as an encroachment of Protestantism. Catholic schools enjoyed a long history
in Louisiana as one of the surviving legacies of the French colonial period, and public
schools competed against private and Catholic schools that were preferred by Louisiana
Creoles. Nationwide, hereditarianism and the deference to Anglo-American language
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and culture drew critics to intelligence and achievement testing. Bond (1924) analyzed
intelligence test data of White males and found a strong correlation between school
achievement and test scores, debunking intelligence tests as a measure of genetic ability.
Price (1934) examined the limitations of using a singular race, socio-economic group,
and geographical location to establish norms used in intelligence tests, and questioned
how Blacks’ intelligence could be accurately measured when they were excluded from
the standardization sample. Sanchez (1934) challenged the validity of intelligence tests
and determined that prejudices often influenced which students were selected for testing
and how scores would be interpreted. These minority scholars were joined by some
White researchers, such as Boas (1943), whose investigations found the nature of
intelligence to be “socially determined” (p. 164).
Especially damaging to hereditarianism was the retraction on genetic intelligence
made by Terman, Goddard, and Brigham. According to Gould (1981), Goddard was first
to recant in a 1928 article in the Journal of Psycho-Asthenics. He changed his position on
the education of the “feeble-minded” by noting that many of these students were capable
of learning and did not require segregated schooling. Terman acknowledged
environmental factors as a condition of test score performance in the 1937 revision of the
Stanford-Binet test (p. 221-222). Eventually, court challenges surfaced to challenge the
practice of educational testing in curriculum placements or ability-grouping. In Hobson v.
Hansen (1967) plaintiffs first questioned the legality of educational testing as a school
policy for deciding curricular assignments. Plaintiffs successfully argued that the tests
were used to disproportionately place Black students in the lowest curriculum tracks.
Hobson was followed by Diana (1970), Covarrubias (1971), and Guadalupe (1972),
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which collectively challenged the overrepresentation of minority students in special
education classes (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001). The combined criticism from court
challenges, research and scholarship, and minority communities, contributed to policy
challenges that reduced the mandatory practice of intelligence and achievement testing in
curricular placements. Many school systems followed the lead from New York City
Public Schools, which discontinued I.Q. testing as a means of classifying students in
1964 (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001). However, criticisms of intelligence and achievement
testing could not prevent the growing use of these tests as an institutional practice among
schools, colleges, and universities. The 1966 Coleman survey reported that ninety percent
of the nation’s students were administered intelligence and/or achievement tests at both
the elementary and secondary levels (Coleman, 1966). The creation of the Educational
Testing Service (ETS) in 1947 fostered systematic use of standardized testing in college
admissions policies and a host of post-secondary institutions (Rein, 1974).
Louisiana officials revived their statewide student testing program during the
desegregation era. The tests became a critical component of Louisiana’s desegregation
policy and were used to produce racially-segregated schools as a natural product of
educational testing and ability-grouping. Eventually, intelligence and achievement tests
became a central criterion for admissions to magnet schools and desegregated
predominantly-White schools. Louisiana state officials also turned to a new form of
achievement testing to uniformly assess all students and their academic achievement. To
address criticisms in standardization design, achievement tests were modified to reflect a
criterion-referenced format that assessed student knowledge of basic or minimum skills.
Minimum competency tests were favored during the desegregation period to measure
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student learning of prescribed core curricula. These tests were applauded as a way of
promoting equity, but often lead to racial inequalities in student promotion and
graduation.

Summary
The State Supervisory Program established a strong precedent for standardized
curriculum and assessment early in the history of Louisiana public education. The push
for standardization tied Louisiana to the larger social efficiency movement of the
Industrial era, but Louisiana state officials also saw achievement testing as a vehicle for
cultural assimilation. The legacy of the State Supervisory Program is a unique
framework of public schooling that later shapes Louisiana high stakes testing policies.
First, the State Supervisory Program embraced standardized curriculum and assessment
as a way of promoting the supremacy of Anglo-American language, culture, and history.
These standards were not totally accepted in Louisiana because of the deep connection to
French colonialism and the system of Catholic schools that nurtured large Creole
communities. The French system of schooling survived as the model for the upper and
middle classes, who continued to service private or Catholic schools to educate their
children. Thus, a dual system of schooling emerged along class lines where the upper
and middle classes of both races predominantly attended nonpublic schools. Another
legacy of the State Supervisory Program is the racial inequalities that it promoted.
Curriculum standards were differentiated according to race and usually limited Black
education to only rudimentary learning. Curriculum, funding, and facilities for Blacks
were unequal to Whites, which led to unequal educational opportunities and attainment
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between the races. Following Brown, racially-segregated schools and the inequalities
that resulted, became the impetus for reviving standardized curriculum and assessment
first initiated under the State Supervisory Program. School desegregation, a failed
economy, and minimum-competency testing (MCT), were important social foundations
of the LEAP that advanced a new excellence rationale for high stakes testing in
Louisiana.
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CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
HIGH STAKES TESTING IN LOUISIANA

From 1976 to 1986, Louisiana policymakers took aggressive action to reform
public education through a policy framework of standards-based reform (SBR). Within a
single decade lawmakers introduced over a hundred education bills to centralize
curriculum, assessment, and student promotion firmly under state control. A 1985
constitutional amendment established The Louisiana Quality Education Fund, one of the
largest education trusts in the country, to finance these reform initiatives. Such action
was atypical for state leaders, who had not supported comprehensive school reform since
the State Supervisory Program was disbanded in the 1930s. Louisiana’s dependence on
unskilled labor and its racially conservative political culture usually hindered state
investment in public education (Elazar, 1984). Prior to the desegregation era, Johnson
(1942) described Louisiana schools as a “vicious circle” where government neglect
created a cycle of poverty that forced many into low-skilled and menial labor. The state’s
large Black student population, who amounted to just under half of all public school
students, particularly suffered from underfunding and exploitation (Anderson, 1988;
Chujo, 1999). Therefore, it is striking to note the aggressive efforts taken to develop the
Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as the state’s first comprehensive
high stakes testing program. The LEAP is Louisiana’s model of standards-based reform,
grounded in the core values of education conservatives post-desegregation: standards,
assessments, and accountability.
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The LEAP began in 1986 as a program of standardized curriculum and
assessments, but evolved into a weapon of school accountability under the revised LEAP
for the 21st Century (LEAP 21) later implemented in 1999. Its origins are permeated by
a number of contextual factors that prompted state leaders to urgently reform public
schools. School desegregation, economic recession, low education rankings, and the
national conservative movement influenced both legislative action and popular opinion in
favor of the testing program. This chapter will detail the social foundations of the LEAP
program to contextualize the larger sociopolitical factors that drew Louisiana
policymakers toward high stakes testing.

School Desegregation
White Flight and Re-segregation
The foundations of Louisiana’s high stakes testing program were laid in the social
upheaval following Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and the court-ordered
desegregation of New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS) in 1960. Louisiana’s
desegregation policy rested on the state’s 1960 pupil placement law (R.S. 17:101), which
authorized pupil assignments on the basis of elaborate standardized testing requirements
and residential proximity to the school (Baker, 1996; McCarrick, 1964; Wieder, 1987).
Pupil placement laws “had become the preferred method of avoiding desegregation” for
southern states by relying on ostensibly nonracial factors to assign students in
desegregated school systems (Klarman, 2004, p. 330). Louisiana’s pupil placement law
carefully omitted race in its wording, and its premise claimed to promote “better
education, peace, and good order” of the state (R.S. 17:101; Baker, 1996, p. 226). Pupil
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placement depended on residential proximity to the school, and because Louisiana’s
housing patterns were usually racially segregated, a vast majority of public schools would
remain segregated as well.
In large urban areas such as New Orleans and Baton Rouge, there was a higher
concentration of Blacks living in close-knit communities alongside Whites. Standardized
testing requirements became essential to maintaining segregation in these urban school
districts. A 1960 report by Louisiana’s flagship newspaper, the Times Picayune, drew
upon Blacks’ lower test scores on the Metropolitan Readiness Test to argue that
differences in academic ability necessitated racially-segregated schools (Muller, 1976).
But, by implementing the testing requirement for Black applicants, school leaders would
ensure a quality education for all White students and minimize integration at the same
time (Muller, 1976, p. 82). Lloyd Rittiner, President of the Orleans Parish School Board
in 1960 and member of the White Citizens Council, speculated that “not more than a
dozen” Blacks would be admitted to only a few White schools but the majority would
remain segregated (p. 83). School leaders and citizens applauded standardized tests as a
necessary requirement to uphold educational standards, but the goal was to defy
desegregation mandates. Supposedly objective measures were used to eliminate Black
candidates for pupil transfer to White schools in a campaign called the “scientific way” to
school integration (Wieder, 1987).
In 1960 New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS) became the first school district in
Louisiana to desegregate, despite much protest and even an attempted coup by the state
legislature (Baker, 1996). Although state and local officials assured that token
integration of only the most talented Black students would occur, Whites immediately
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boycotted the desegregated school system. Black students steadily repopulated these
emptied schools post-desegregation. The Black student population in New Orleans Public
Schools had been 57 percent prior to school desegregation in 1960. It rose to 70 percent
in 1970, 86 percent in 1984, and 92 percent in 1993 (Baker, 1996, p. 472-473). In 1981,
court-ordered desegregation of East Baton Rouge Parish also led to White boycotts and
the repopulation of Black students in Baton Rouge’s public schools. According to
Bankston and Caldas’ (2002) seminal work on Louisiana desegregation, the percentage of
Black students in East Baton Rouge Parish remained constant during the years 1960-1980
at just under 40 percent. The onset of court-ordered desegregation and busing in 1981
lead to a “precipitous flight of White students to Baton Rouge’s nonpublic schools” (p.
89-91). The percentage of Black students in East Baton Rouge public schools rose to 44
percent in 1981 and nearly 70 percent in 2000 (p. 90-99). White students that remained
in East Baton Rouge public schools were heavily concentrated in magnet schools that
were created to stem the tide of White flight. The declining percentage of White students
in public schools occurred when the total population of White residents actually increased
in Baton Rouge. The pattern in which desegregation lead to rapid and sharp decline of
Whites in public schools was repeated in Lafayette (p. 111-112), Jefferson (p. 151), St.
John the Baptist (p. 159), Rapides (p. 168), Caddo (p. 171-172), and Monroe (p. 183)
parishes. In 1960, just prior to desegregation in Louisiana, Blacks were 31.9 percent of
the total population in Louisiana and 39.1 percent of all public school students (Public
Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 14). Although the total Black population of Louisiana
had remained constant at about 30 percent, Black students increased to 47 percent of the
public school population in the 1990s (Bankston & Caldas, 2002). Importantly, Black
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students dominated public schools in the strategic port city of New Orleans (93 percent)
and the state capitol Baton Rouge (70 percent) by the end of the twentieth century. By
contrast, Whites were 67 percent of the state population, but only 44 percent of public
school students in the 1990s. Most Whites resettled in all-White or majority-White
public school districts or utilized nonpublic schools, essentially continuing the system of
segregated schooling post-Brown (Baker, 1996, p. 473).
The Concern for Educational Quality
School desegregation was the impetus behind the decline of White students in
public schools and in urban schools in particular, but the desire for educational quality
was popularly stated in defense of these actions. Leeson (1966) documented the rise in
nonpublic school enrollment in Louisiana and around the country immediately following
desegregation orders. Parents cited the desire for “quality education” as their motivation
for leaving public schools (p. 22). The Louisiana Legislature even provided tuition
grants for up to $360 to pay private school tuition (p. 22) until the action was ruled
unconstitutional in 1967. When New Orleans desegregated in 1960, Muller (1976)
observed that New Orleans White private school enrollment rose by nearly 2100 and the
parochial school enrollment increased by over 1000 in that same year (p. 88). McDonogh
#19 Elementary School, one of the two desegregated White schools in New Orleans in
1960, was completely boycotted by Whites by the end of the first week of desegregation
although only three Black students had been admitted (p. 87). In the 1970-1971 school
year alone the nonpublic enrollment in New Orleans increased by 90.3 percent over the
previous year (Erickson & Donovan, 1972). “Race-related events” were the “most
powerful explanatory variables” for the rapid enrollment in nonpublic schools (Erickson
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& Donovan, 1976, p. 3), although parents discussed race in terms of their concern for
quality in educational outcomes. The Public Affairs Research Council (1969) found that
for most Whites, the “concern for educational outcomes [was] fed by long-held attitudes”
toward Blacks that invoked segregationist ideals (p. 43). Although concerns for
educational quality were used in defense of White flight from public schools, the rate and
scale in which Whites fled schools suggest the desire to uphold segregation was
preeminent in their actions.
However, in some cases Whites who feared their children would be desegregated
to a predominantly Black school did have legitimate concerns for educational quality.
Although public education in general progressed more slowly in Louisiana than in
Northern states, the conditions of Black schools comparable to those schools serving
Whites were grossly unequal (Public Affairs Research Council, 1969). In 1950-51, on
the eve of Brown, 34.4 percent of Blacks attended small one-teacher schools compared to
only 3.3 percent of Whites. There were 191,284 Black students registered in schools, but
only 5,528 teachers hired to teach them. Black teachers were paid 30 percent lower than
White teachers, despite their higher rate of advanced degrees and the much higher
student-teacher ratio in Black schools. The inventory value of school facilities and
equipment in Black schools was three times lower than the value of White facilities
(Public Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 18-19). Due to underfunding of Black
education pre-Brown, most Black schools were unequal to White schools in the quality of
facilities, resources, curriculum, and opportunities for advancement. These concerns for
educational quality fueled Blacks’ efforts toward school desegregation and greater racial
equality. However, these same concerns for educational quality discouraged many
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Whites from desegregated schools with significant Black populations. Even Whites
sympathetic to school desegregation were unwilling to enroll their children in their
neighborhood school if the school was predominantly Black (Public Affairs Research
Council, 1969, p. 43).
Whites’ resistance to desegregated schools, either due to racism or legitimate
concerns for educational quality, only exasperated low support for public education in
general and particularly in New Orleans and East Baton Rouge Parish where Blacks were
overrepresented. For example, New Orleans voters rejected tax increases to support
public schools from 1967-1980—representing 13 years of declining local revenues to
supplement state funding. At that time about 85 percent of the school system’s 84,000
students were Black (Moore, 1981). Charles Martin, the retiring school superintendent of
New Orleans Public Schools in 1980, cited the lack of community and financial support.
as the central reason for a multi-million deficit of the school system at the end of his
term. Martin remarked to the Times Picayune in his final interview, “Having adequate
funding does not guarantee quality, but the absence of the dollar ensures inferior
education” (McKendall, 1985, p. 4). As more public schools desegregated, and
specifically in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, public schools became synonymous with
poor educational quality. This unfavorable image of public schools was partly due to
economic divestment in public schools post-desegregation and partly because of a strong
desire to uphold racial segregation.
The Campaign Against Social Promotion
Despite a negative public school image, graduation rates in Louisiana
significantly increased in the immediate years following desegregation. In 1967 the
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graduation rate of White students was 68 percent in comparison to about 42 percent of
Black students (Public Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 26-27). However, the Black
graduation rate was three times greater than it was only a decade earlier in 1957. Black
schools had greatly improved in student promotion or “holding power” as a Public
Affairs Research Council report noted (Public Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 26).
Black student promotion and graduation rates were likely assisted by the rise in Black
teachers, who also rose to the proportionate 36 percent in 1967 (Public Affairs Research
Council, 1969). Louisiana’s rising graduation rates were emblematic of a growing
national trend to expand high school programs and compulsory attendance laws. School
desegregation and civil rights laws granted racial minorities more access to secondary
education, which played a tremendous role in Louisiana where Blacks students accounted
for about forty percent of all public school students following desegregation (Bankston &
Caldas, 2002). A sharp increase in Black high school graduates was viewed suspiciously,
however, especially since Blacks’ standardized test scores often still lagged behind
Whites. The concern was immediately raised in New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS),
Louisiana’s first desegregated school system, during the Orleans Parish School Board
election in 1972 (The Times Picayune, November 1972, p. 7). At a League of Women
Voters campaign forum in 1972, school board candidates discussed the success of teacher
certification tests in eliminating unqualified teachers and the need for competency tests in
schools to remove social promotion.
Social promotion had become a growing concern during the desegregation era,
and states such as Florida and Mississippi passed legislation in 1975 for statewide testing
programs to reduce social promotion and toughen graduation requirements in schools
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(Schechter, 1981). By 1978 the social promotion crisis rose to national prominence and
spurred education reform towards minimum competency testing throughout the country.
CBS News produced a three-part evening news series, “Is Anyone Out There Learning?
A Report Card on American Public Education,” that symbolized the national mood
concerning social promotion (CBS Broadcasting Inc., August 22, 1978). This series
labeled recent high school graduates “functional illiterates” who glided through
coursework without learning basic reading, writing, or communication skills. The lack of
student motivation, the series continued, led to disciplinary problems, drugs, and violence
in high schools within major American cities. Later that same year, Louisiana officials
held an education conference in the New Orleans Superdome entitled, “Louisiana:
Priorities for the Future” (Grady, 1978). Participants discussed the results of a recent
education taskforce, who raised the issue of social promotion as the most pressing
problem facing Louisianans. The taskforce questioned the literacy skills of recent high
school graduates and complained that the business community was bearing the financial
responsibility of training new employees in remedial literacy and communication skills.
One of the centerpieces of the taskforce recommendations was the administration of a
comprehensive examination as a vehicle for certifying the competence of high school
graduates (Grady, 1978).
School desegregation dismantled Louisiana’s traditional dual system of raciallysegregated schools, and expanded access to the state’s large Black student population.
State officials and a racially conservative White majority rallied against unpopular
desegregation mandates and what was perceived as an increasing number of incompetent
high school graduates. The campaign against social promotion and desegregation
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mandates, coupled with the growing negative image of public schools in New Orleans
and Baton Rouge, pressured state policymakers for immediate and aggressive school
reform. The years 1972-1974 introduced a new governor and state constitution to tackle
educational policy and governance that would provide the infrastructure needed to
engineer a comprehensive high stakes testing program.

Governor Edwin Edwards and the 1974 Constitution
Edwin Edwards was first elected in 1972 and eventually served four terms as
Louisiana’s governor (1972-1980, 1984-1988, and 1992-1996). He was born in
Avoyelles Parish, a rural area of Louisiana populated by French-speaking Cajuns. After
a short career as a lawyer in southwestern Acadia Parish, he began his political career as
a local city councilman in 1954. Ten years later he won an election to the Louisiana State
Senate and, after only one year in the state senate, he was elected to the United States
House of Representatives in 1965. When he became governor in 1972, Edwards
positioned himself as a populist Democrat in the likeness of Huey P. Long. This populist
image extended throughout his political career, and he is credited for increasing
government aid to the poor and making Black and women appointments to civil service.
However, Edwards’ governorship was marred by criminal indictment and conviction for
numerous charges of political corruption. Political scandal and personal infidelities
dominate his biography and other publications about his life (Honeycutt, 2009; Bridges,
2002).
Although Edwards is most remembered for his public criminal trials, he worked
privately to engineer significant reform to Louisiana’s educational system. His
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gubernatorial terms coincide with Louisiana’s desegregation period and the transition to
standards-based reform. During his first campaign in 1971, Edwards promised a
Constitutional Convention to modernize the language and functionality of Louisiana’s
existing 1921 Constitution. Soon after his election, a total of 132 delegates met on
Louisiana State University’s campus to debate and revise articles relating to education,
labor, and legislative procedures. Congressional delegates were former or existing state
legislators and Edwards appointees (Ducote, 2001). According to their changes in the
new 1974 Constitution, the state legislature must “provide for the education of the people
of the state and shall establish and maintain a public educational system consisting of all
schools” (LA Const. Art. VIII § 1). The wording “education of the people” was added to
the Constitution to broaden the legislature’s jurisdiction beyond only public education.
Another section provided for a new Board of Elementary and Secondary Education
(BESE), created as body corporate to “supervise and control the public elementary and
secondary schools” and assume “budgetary responsibility for all funds appropriated or
allocated by the state for those schools” (LA Const. Art. VIII § 4, A). BESE became the
state legislature’s policymaking arm that oversees both the School Superintendent and the
Department of Education. BESE assumed budgetary and policymaking powers for public
schools as a constitutionally-protected body. In a later section of the Constitution, private
schools could apply for a certificate of approval from BESE which “shall carry the same
privileges as one issued by a state public school” (LA Const. Art. VIII § 4). Members of
the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) objected to these changes in constitutional
language, which they viewed as a veiled attempt to extend monies to private school
education under constitutional protection. In a letter to the Elementary and Secondary
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Education Subcommittee, they argued that,
The OPSB sees this change as a threatened reduction in funds for public
education. The OPSB reaffirms its conviction that public funds should not be used
for the general support of non-public schools. (Louisiana Constitutional
Convention Minutes, August 29, 1973, p. 52)
There was marked disagreement at the Constitutional Convention on whether BESE
members should be elected or appointed by the Governor. Edwards lobbied for the
authority to appoint both BESE members and the State School Superintendent. By
removing the elective office, BESE members would be answerable to Edwards instead of
local citizens in public school districts. Louisiana voters ultimately rejected Edwards’
proposal of appointed BESE members and State School Superintendent, but governors
were granted three appointees to BESE’s eleven-member Board. BESE has eleven
members who serve four-year terms with no term limits for office. Eight members are
elected from specially-drawn BESE districts and three are appointed by the Governor.
Edwards used these appointees to represent gubernatorial interests in fiscal and
policymaking decisions, and he assumed an influential role in BESE through his political
muscle within the state (Honeycutt, 2009). Later, Edwards was also successful in
changing the elective position of the State Superintendent to an appointed post. A 1984
conflict with Thomas Clausen, former teacher and last elected Superintendent, arose
when Clausen wanted to reduce the passing score for the teacher certification test without
BESE approval. Edwards “ felt the move was diametrically opposed to new initiatives
and countered with a bill not allowing the Superintendent to lower standards”
(Honeycutt, 2009, p. 221). Following this bill, Edwards obtained the legislative backing
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to make the Superintendent a BESE-appointed post through legislative act.
Another disagreement at the 1974 Constitutional Convention was the issue of Black
representation on BESE. J.K. Haynes, a member of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Subcommittee at the Convention, submitted a proposal for Blacks to receive
equal or at least proportionate representation on BESE. The motion was ultimately
denied, but delegate Anthony Rachal submitted a separate statement to the Constitutional
records expressing his disappointment considering the large Black public school
population in the state (Louisiana Constitutional Convention Minutes, 1973). Keith
Johnson, BESE’s first Black member, was elected from New Orleans in 1984 and
remained the only Black member until the mid-1990s.
The 1974 Constitution ushered in significant changes educational policymaking in
Louisiana that directly influenced the development of high stakes testing. With the
creation of BESE, state lawmakers established a constitutionally-protected body to
develop and execute policies as an agency of the state legislature. BESE had the capacity
to implement school policy in a more efficient manner than the lawmaking process.
BESE also solved the legislature’s earlier problems with constitutionality when a judge
disallowed its intervention into the New Orleans desegregation crisis of 1960; BESE was
constitutionally-protected to intercede in local public school systems and provide the
necessary oversight. The 1974 Constitution also expanded privileges to private schools
and broadened the state’s responsibility to both public and private education. This
change in constitutional language signaled the state’s intention to extend their educational
appropriations and political support to nonpublic schools. As the desegregation period
loomed forward particularly in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, nonpublic schools
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established standing to compete for funding from the state’s education budget.
Competition for state funds grew significantly during the late 1970s and early 1980s due
to a financial recession that gripped state government.

The Oil Boom and Bust
Since the decline of cotton and agricultural production in the early twentieth
century, Louisiana shifted to an industrial economy that relied on the mining of its natural
resources—principally oil, natural gas, and timber. Louisiana’s lucrative oil and gas
lands accounted for nearly 50% of the state’s revenues by the 1970s and garnered oil
lobbyists a powerful voice in educational policy (Southwest Educational Development
Laboratory, 1999, pg. 1-2). Oil companies depended on low-skilled laborers to support
drilling operations in rural Louisiana, and they often rallied against higher taxes to fund
large-scale school initiatives. When the price of oil dropped sharply in the 1980s,
however, high unemployment and reduced revenues lead to large state deficits.
Postsecondary and K-12 education programs were among the state’s largest expenditures,
and legislators pressed for ways to hold schools accountable for their funding. Unlike
most states, Louisiana finances its public education system mainly through sales taxes
rather than property taxes. Protected by constitutional language, Louisianans enjoy
substantial homestead exemptions where most citizens pay virtually no property tax
(Clendinen, 1986). With fewer tax revenues from its oil income, state legislators relied
more heavily on sales taxes from local businesses to fund its education programs. In
response, business organizations such as the Louisiana Association of Business and
Industry (LABI) and the Public Affairs Research Council (PAR) objected to higher taxes
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to support what they considered wasteful spending in public schools. These leading
business organizations sponsored research and public forums to press for school
accountability, education standards, and reduced taxes. In fact, it was the Public Affair
Research Council executive Ed Steimel that first used the term “school accountability” at
the 1972 Constitutional Convention in discussions concerning BESE (Louisiana
Constitutional Convention Minutes, 1972).
The Public Affairs Research Council (henceforth called by its common name
PAR), established in 1950, is a policy research think-tank that investigates state and local
government issues in Louisiana (PAR, www.la-par.org). It was founded by a group of
leading professionals in industry, education, business, and government. As a nonpartisan,
nonprofit research organization, PAR is supported through tax-deductible donations from
its prominent membership. According to its website, PAR does not lobby but its
“research gets results” through policy recommendations that lead to governmental
reforms. PAR “plants the seeds, cultivates the field of public opinion, and let others
lobby.” PAR planted its strongest seeds in educational reform, particularly standardsbased reform and school accountability. Its investigative reports concerning K-12 school
accountability can be traced as far back as the early 1980s, just as declining oil revenues
began to deplete state reserves. The business community demanded greater urgency in
school regulations that motivated legislators to act on recommendations to toughen
promotion and graduation guidelines.
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Dissatisfaction with Minimum-Competency Tests
The Rise of Minimum-Competency Testing
Louisiana’s first testing program began in 1920 as a component of the State
Supervisory Program initiated by then-Superintendent T.H. Harris (Rogers, 1936). Harris
created the program to promote school curricula reflective of Anglo-American history,
language, and culture. The testing program was discontinued in 1933, and state interest
in standardized curriculum and assessment waned until the National Association of
Educational Progress (NAEP) tests were first administered in 1969 (Louisiana
Department of Education Math Highlights Report, 1976). In response to Louisiana’s
below-average performance on NAEP tests, the Louisiana Department of Education
(LADOE) created the Louisiana Assessment Program in 1973. Modeled after NAEP
assessments, the Louisiana Assessment Program tested a stratified random sample of
15,000 students and 5,000 students were tested in each key age level (nine year olds,
fourteen year olds, and seventeen year olds). Reading tests were first administered in
1973, followed by Math and Social Studies in 1974, and Science in 1976. Louisiana
students performed comparable to their southeastern counterparts in all academic areas,
but continued to score below the national average (Louisiana Department of Education,
Math Highlights Report, 1976). Louisiana’s lagging performance on these normative
tests fueled political debates concerning social promotion just as Blacks’ access to
desegregated schools widened.
State legislators passed the state’s first school accountability act in 1977. Act
621, The Public School Accountability and Assessment Act, authorized statewide
minimum standards in pupil proficiency in reading, writing, and math (R.S. 17:391.1-
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391.10). One of the sponsors of this act was Cecil Picard, a state representative from
Vermillion Parish first elected to the state House of Representatives in 1975. Picard, a
former high school principal, was later elected to the state Senate in 1979 and appointed
chairman of the Senate Education Committee when LEAP was developed and
implemented. The Public School Accountability and Assessment Act required a system
of shared accountability for all stakeholders to perform their respective responsibilities
and duties in public education (Official Journal of the State, 1977). A list of stakeholders
held accountable to taxpayers included BESE, local school boards, administrators,
principals, teachers, parents, and students. The Act sought to assure that all programs
“lead to the attainment of established goals for education” and basic, uniform skills and
concepts were identified for each grade level (p. 1687). The law also stipulated that all
students, rather than a randomized sample, would be tested in key grade levels and
specified increased appropriations to the education budget for this purpose. The Act
authorized a system of accountability for public schools (albeit very generally), and
directed BESE and the State Superintendent to decide the policies, standards,
assessments, and grades to be tested. Importantly, a section of the Act specifically
dictated that the testing program should not be used to deny students promotion or
graduation. In Section E, the law stipulated that,
No provision of this Part shall be construed to mean, or represented to require,
that graduation from a high school or promotion to another grade level is in any
way dependent upon successful performance on any test administered as a part of
this testing program (Official Journal of the State, 1977, p. 1688)
In compliance with Act 621, BESE coordinated with State Superintendent J. Kelly Nix to
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adopt minimum standards in reading, writing, and mathematics, and to establish the new
Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) as a minimum-competency test for all
students in grades 7 and 10. In the Superintendent’s first legislative report of the LSAP,
the tests were purposed to measure student performance and obtain demographic data
related to student achievement (Legislative Report of the Louisiana State Assessment
Program, p. 3). The LSAP was intended to promote school accountability through
monitoring student progress, publishing test results, and assisting instructional planning
to improve performance. Schools were advised to consider the reading assessments as a
factor in student promotion, and literacy was the only subject area that was emphasized in
promotion according to the law.
In 1979, just two years after its first accountability law, the state legislature
passed Act 750, the Competency Based Education Law, which requires BESE to develop
minimum standards and curriculum guidelines in all core content areas at all grade levels
(Official Journal of the State, 1979). This Act established the Louisiana Competency
Based Program as a comprehensive educational program based on core curriculum
standards, a literary assessment, and pupil progression plans. Pupil progression plans
were defined as a set of criteria each school system must evaluate to determine
promotional and retention decisions. Local school systems had to submit pupil
progression plans for approval by BESE before implemented. The law directed school
officials to place emphasis on “mastery of reading, writing, and mathematics as
consideration for promotion and placement provided that other factors shall be
considered” (Official Journal of the State, 1979, p. 2099). A new testing program called
the Basic Skills Testing Program (BST) was also included in the legislation to measure
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student achievement in reading, math, and language arts abilities at all grade levels. To
increase student accountability, substantive changes to promotion guidelines were made:
1) mathematics and language arts were added to reading as promotional subjects; and 2)
the state tests were described as “principal criteria” for grade-to-grade promotion
(Pechman, 1982). The Basic Skills Test (BST) was a criterion-referenced, minimumcompetency test first administered in 1981-82 school year to 56,000 second-graders. A
new grade level was added to the student assessment program each year (third grade BST
was added in 1983; and fourth grade was added in 1984). BESE made plans to add a new
grade level each year until all grades 2-12 were tested in 1992. The new Competency
Based Education Law reiterated the stipulation in the earlier Public School
Accountability Act, which indicated that teachers determined promotion or placement of
students but particular emphasis should be placed on students’ mastery of basic skills
(Official Journal of the State, 1979, p. 2102). The competency based education law did
not specify that student mastery would be defined solely by the Basic Skills Test, but it
did repeal Section E of the earlier Public School Accountability Act. This section
specifically stated that promotion and graduation could not be denied because of failing
scores on the state exam. Section E was “hereby specifically repealed” in clear, stated
terms in the new Competency Based Education Law (p. 2103). In addition, the new law
required summer remediation for students who failed the BST and appropriated monies to
operate remediation centers in central locations throughout the state.
By 1980, two student assessment programs emerged in Louisiana under mandate
from the state legislature. First, the Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) was
authorized in 1977, and the State Superintendent decided to assess secondary students in
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grades 7 and 10 with the purposes of publishing test results and gathering demographic
data relative to student achievement. In the LSAP students were scored by the
percentage of correct answers on the test, but it did not establish a cut-off score for
student performance. The LSAP was primarily used to publish student achievement
results and aid instructional and promotional decisions. Second, the Basic Skills Test
(BST) was authorized in 1979 for grade 2 in Reading and Math achievement, wherein
eventually all grades would be tested by 1992. BESE required students to attain at least a
75% proficiency level to successfully pass the BST. Teachers had the option of retaining
or promoting students who lacked proficiency on the BST, but local districts had to
include the BST as a factor in promotional decisions. BESE required school districts to
develop a pupil progression plan, a policy that outlined specific criteria for student
promotion, in which BST scores were made a principal criterion. Rather than using a
commercial standardized test, the state legislature contracted with a testing agency to
develop, administer, and score the Basic Skills Tests (Rachal & Hoffman, 1985). A
committee of teachers, principals, parents, and interested citizens collaborated with the
testing agency to identify skills and concepts included in curriculum standards and
assessed by the BST and LSAP. These educators were integral to standard setting, test
development, and field testing. The Superintendent provided a Calendar of Skills to
inform parents of skills to be learned and an individual report on student progress. The
BST was designed to end social promotion by requiring all students to master basic skills,
establishing a cutoff score for proficiency levels, and holding all students accountable to
taxpayers.
In the post-desegregation era, many state governments implemented minimum-
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competency testing programs similar to Louisiana’s Basic Skills Test (Pipho, 1978). The
socio-political climate of the 1960s and 1970s differed greatly from the industrial period
of the early twentieth century. Airisian (1987) describes this episode in American history
as the “age of equity,” beginning first with the historic Brown (1954) decision and
continuing with civil rights legislative and policy initiatives at the local, state, and federal
level (p. 396). School policy reform adopted three approaches to educational equity:
equalizing inputs or financial resources among schools; equalizing outcomes in
achievement or opportunity; and increasing inputs for low-performing students in order
to equalize outcomes (Serow & Davies, 1982; Shepard, 1980). In addition to educational
equity, policymakers sought to address the perceived lack of intellectual rigor in schools.
Competency-based education fit neatly with public ideals for both school equity and
intellectual rigor. Its antecedents are found in the theoretical works of Carroll (1963) and
Bloom, Hastings, & Madaus (1971) that describe a mastery learning model where every
student could achieve a criterion level of knowledge and skills. Instructional inputs
(resources, materials, and instructional support) are differentiated according to students’
needs, and constant testing and remediation ensured every child progressed to the
intended level. In school practice, competency based education required every student to
demonstrate mastery or attainment of specified criteria (Palardy & Eisele, 1972).
Minimum-competency testing was promoted as a policy of school equity because it
publicly identified the specific learning objectives that would be tested; acted as a
diagnostic mechanism to identify students requiring remediation; and allowed state and
district officials to intervene directly into classrooms to promote equal educational
outcomes (Winfield, 1990). It also functioned as a policy to end social promotion. Test
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development was generally made by authorities external to the teacher or local school
district, and scores were often the determining factor in grade-to-grade promotion or high
school graduation. By the mid-1970s over thirty-five states required local school districts
to authorize MCT in elementary and secondary schools, including Louisiana (Pipho,
1978). Louisiana’s Basic Skills Test (BST) was more aggressive than most minimumcompetency tests at the time because the BST would eventually assess all grade levels as
a form of universal achievement testing with cutoff scores for student performance.
Concern for Social Promotion Unabated
In just three years Louisiana officials implemented statewide curriculum
standards and corresponding assessments for both elementary and secondary levels, yet
there was still public concern that the tests were not rigorous enough to eliminate social
promotion. In 1981 the Times Picayune published an influential education series called
New Orleans Schools in Crisis. In the opening article, author Molly Moore wrote,
In the last 20 years, the New Orleans Public School System has fallen into a
critical state of academic, physical and financial despair. It is a school system of
poor children, dilapidated schoolhouses, pinched budgets and a dismal public
image. If it is judged on the quality of students it is producing, the system
generally earns failing grades. (Moore, 1981, pg. 1)
Moore continued by noting the system’s declining test scores on national normreferenced tests and low scores on the new state BST implemented earlier that year. In a
separate article examining the rise in remedial education at area colleges, Moore decried
recent graduates’ lack of college readiness and skills that render them unprepared for
college-level work. Echoing the sentiments of many BST critics, Moore complained that
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another decade would pass before social promotion would be curbed throughout the state.
The BST was designed to add grade levels incrementally each year when public schools
required more immediate action to improve academic standards.
A year after the Picayune education series, students’ relatively high scores on the
BST also did little to satisfy public scrutiny. On the first BST results in 1982, 89 percent
of all students passed both the Reading and Math sections, 92 percent passed Reading,
and 95 percent passed Math (Hays, 1982). Students in the New Orleans metropolitan
area showed the widest discrepancy in test scores, but test scores reflected socioeconomic differences rather than race. In New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS), a
predominantly poor and Black school district, 75 percent of all students passed both
sections of the BST. The same passing rate was found in neighboring St. Bernard Public
Schools, a predominantly poor and White school district. But in St. Tammany Parish, an
affluent suburb of New Orleans, student test scores were among the highest in the state
(Hays, 1982). By 1984, the state’s average score for second-graders topped 95 percent
and 97 percent in Reading and Math, respectively. The state averages for third-grade
Reading and Math proficiency were 93 percent and 89 percent, respectively. The state
averages for the new fourth grade tests were 87 percent and 89 percent in Reading and
Math, respectively. Overall, students performed very well on the BST statewide, far
outperforming the 75 percent proficiency level set by BESE.
New Orleans Public Schools, although still showing one of the lowest BST
district averages, had improved to meet the state average for all grades except the fourth
grade in 1984. However, not all New Orleanians were convinced of the school system’s
academic progress. A group of New Orleans citizens from its affluent uptown
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neighborhoods formed a citizens’ task force in 1984 to investigate “unlikely scores” on
the BST and any occurrences of testing abuse (McKendall, 1984). Although no cases of
testing abuse were found, task force member and Tulane professor Samuel Stringfield
volunteered to continue the analysis of testing results to further investigate test scores in
New Orleans. In an interview with the Times Picayune, Ellen Pechman, Director of
Testing and Evaluation for the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB), attributed the rising
test scores to improved instructional practices and greater familiarity with curriculum
standards and assessments. In a later editorial to the Times Picayune, local principal
Edward Washington questioned the public distrust of rising test scores in New Orleans.
Washington criticized the lack of congratulatory response received from the both the
Picayune and the larger New Orleans community to acknowledge that public school
teachers and students performed well (Washington, 1984).
Criticism against the BST program grew as test scores continued to improve and
their effect on social promotion appeared minimal. In Baton Rouge’s legislative
newspaper, The Advocate, lawmakers began to publicly complain that BST program
wasted state funds at a time when the state’s reserves were scarce. Since 1982, oil
reserves fell from a high of 1.6 billion to just under $800 million annually (Clendinen,
1984). The 1979 Competency Based Education Law appropriated $506, 000 to the
Department of Education to operate the new Competency-Based Program, and
particularly student summer remediation and the BST. Half of Louisiana’s oil profits had
disappeared, just as the costs of financing public education increased.

57

Standards-Based Reform in Louisiana
The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan was the impetus for educational reform that
promoted standard courses of study using a classical liberal curriculum. The Reagan
administration organized a national commission to investigate a perceived mediocrity in
the public schools that threatened the country’s ability to produce a competitive
workforce. The National Commission on Excellence in Education released its Nation at
Risk report in 1983, and set the course for a national movement toward standards-based
reform (SBR). The report contained thirty-eight recommendations for establishing
school excellence through aggressive policymaking, standardized curriculum, and
rigorous assessments (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). A year
later the Education Commission of the States (ECS) convened a national conference with
state policymakers to discuss school excellence and implementation of Nation at Risk
recommendations (Pipho, 1984).
The excellence rationale espoused egalitarian ideals that required every student to
master a uniform and rigorous program of study regardless of social, familial, or racial
backgrounds. School excellence advocates claimed benefits to both the student and the
state; students gained higher-level skills and equal opportunity to learn, and the state
gained a competent citizenry that ensured the continued prosperity of the nation. For
school excellence advocates these “higher-level skills” were found in traditional
academic disciplines of the natural sciences and humanities. Finn & Ravitch (1984) were
especially outspoken critics of functional or social education as the harbinger of
mediocrity in school curriculum. In Against Mediocrity, the authors summarize the ideals
of the excellence movement and its egalitarian mission when they penned,
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Those who today would deny the humanities as part of the educational birthright
of every American are denying the very dream of a free and just society for all.
(Finn & Ravitch, 1984, p. 241)
The standards-based reform (SBR) movement in Louisiana emerged from debates
surrounding Nation at Risk and well-known school excellence advocates such as Chester
Finn and Diane Ravitch. Such rhetoric represented a shift from earlier equity rationales
of school policy reform that were supported by desegregation advocates. Rigorous
curriculum and assessments replaced minimum competency testing as the preferred
policy to raise educational standards, provide equal opportunity, and prevent social
promotion. The excellence rationale resonated sharply in Baton Rouge, where the
contentious 1981 desegregation mandate pressed conservatives in Louisiana for the use
of more aggressive testing policies to stymie school desegregation. Many hoped SBR
would satisfy court mandates for equal access and opportunity, while toughening
promotion and graduation guidelines.
Soon after Nation at Risk was released in 1983, election campaigns for local
school boards and BESE were overrun with education conservatives seeking candidacy to
instill academic excellence in schools. Most significantly, the newly elected State School
Superintendent Thomas Clausen ran a highly publicized and successful campaign against
minimum competency testing in 1983. In an interview with The Times Picayune, he
argued that student mastery of curriculum standards, rather than basic understanding,
should be used as the barometer for student promotion (The Times Picayune, June 1983).
Once elected, Clausen authorized the LADOE’s Bureau of Evaluation to lead two studies
investigating alternative testing strategies for Louisiana other than BST. Hoffman (1984)
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conducted one study, and reported that both parents and local school systems desired
higher standards of curriculum and assessment for students. Later, in an analysis of
student remediation and effect on BST scores, Rachal and Hoffman (1985) found that
remediation did not improve student deficiencies in students who failed the BST. In
order to ensure students possessed adequate skills and concepts, failing students required
both remediation and retention in their current grade level. These two studies were
supported by mounting criticism of the BST program, particularly from lawmakers and
the press, who argued that the BST lack rigor and failed to prevent social promotion. The
BST was attacked for lacking difficulty (reflected by the high passing rates) and
reinforcing low standards for students.
Newly-elected BESE members also undertook greater action toward standardsbased reform and high stakes testing. In early 1984 BESE voted new requirements for
high school graduates that increased both high school course requirements and introduced
a high school exit exam (Loupe, 1984). Following recommendations from Nation at
Risk, BESE increased high school coursework to four units of English, three units of
math, three units of science, and three units of social studies. BESE reduced elective
offerings and standardized core courses so that all students followed uniform curricula
throughout the state. BESE also voted to establish a high school exit exam for graduates
in order to receive their diplomas. The proposed requirements, including exit exam, were
intended for all schools carrying the BESE seal—both public and private. In a separate
meeting concerning elementary education, BESE voted to increase the BST cutoff score
to 80 percent, and students who failed to achieve 80 percent proficiency on the BST were
recommended for retention (The Times Picayune, January 1984). BESE’s actions were
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streamlined to the central ideals of standards-based reform. Standards-based reform’s
core educational philosophy—the idea that school systems could achieve equity and
excellence through standardized curriculum and assessment versus desegregation
mandates—provided a policy framework to balance minority rights with the demands of
a conservative majority.
BESE’s decision to establish a high school exit exam proved more difficult to
implement than expected, considering the public mandate for raising academic standards
in schools. Nonpublic parents and students objected to BESE’s private school stipulation
in their reform agenda, and petitioned the state legislature to prevent BESE from
overstepping their regulatory authority (Johnson, 1995, p. 186). Also, the state’s
impending financial crisis threatened to halt any reform initiatives from taking root. The
costs of running the existing BST program and remediation were plenty for the state’s
strained education budget, and the legislature funded the program by making other cuts to
the basic operating budget for schools. Although state education officials embraced high
stakes testing reform, BESE’s 1984 reform initiatives were delayed by the impending
financial collapse of the state. SBR could not advance in Louisiana without a consistent
funding source to protect reform initiatives against future budget shortfalls.

The Louisiana Quality Education Fund
The BST program caused the price of public education to surge with little
evidence of curbing promotion and graduation rates. By the mid-1980s lower oil
revenues began to make a considerable impact on the Louisiana economy and the future
of the BST. The 1979 Competency Based Education Law required the state to provide
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remediation for all students who did not reach mastery on the BST, but these funds had to
obtain approval from the state legislature each year. Remediation programs were fully
funded for only the first year of the BST, but funds for the second year were not
forthcoming (Peck, 1981). Sixteen remediation centers were proposed in the original law
but half of those could not be established due to lack of state funding (Peck, 1981, p. 5).
Student remediation programs were funded through per-pupil allocations to the education
budget that were separate from the funding formula for basic school operations, called the
Minimum Foundation Formula. With little state aid to provide for student remediation,
school systems with larger underperforming populations such as New Orleans and St.
Helena parishes shielded the financial burden for BST remediation out of their operating
budget (Hodge, 1984). These local school districts began to challenge the BST’s role as
“principal criterion” in promotion decisions given the lack of state funding for student
remediation. The weakening state economy threatened the future of BST or any
comprehensive school reform agenda.
In early 1985 a growing state deficit set records in Louisiana history, and most
believed Louisiana’s experiment in standards-based reform was doomed. The 1985 BST
administration was cancelled entirely because the legislature failed to appropriate monies
to finance the testing program (Wardlaw, 1986). Also, the Times Picayune published
another scathing education series in 1985 called, “Cheating Our Children” (The Times
Picayune, October 1985). The Picayune based their education series on a newly released
report by the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI). The LABI report
found that Louisiana school systems spent a higher than average proportion of monies on
support services such as transportation, food, and school counselors. The report
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attributed the state’s below-average student achievement on the misappropriation of
school funds by local school systems. It also suggested that school systems required
better management of existing monies instead of additional funding. LABI lobbied
aggressively against higher taxes, and supported cuts to school funding that would
eliminate administrative and support staff.
Governor Edwards was re-elected in 1984 amid huge state deficits and the
inability to deliver on campaign promises for comprehensive education reform. Edwards,
who defended the BST program as a model for increasing student achievement for all
Louisiana’s children, pledged to reduce the existing education budget by 5 percent and
re-evaluate the BST program and its effectiveness in school accountability (Clendinen,
1986). He hurried negotiations for a settlement with the federal government concerning a
long-running court battle over mineral rights and industry profits from the Gulf of
Mexico shoreline. In November 1985 Edwards announced the “8g” settlement, a $700
million windfall from the federal government to end Louisiana’s suit over mineral rights
and revenues from its shoreline. Edwards backed a bill by Baton Rouge State Senator
Thomas A. Hudson, who wanted to place the money into a dedicated trust for education.
Edwards and state legislators placed about $600 million into a constitutionally-dedicated
education trust to support high stakes testing reforms. The money was placed in an
interest-bearing account that would yield about $200 million for Louisiana each year,
commonly called The Louisiana Quality Education Fund or “8g” funds. PAR’S Edward
Steimel, now representing Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI),
lobbied state government in support of using the multi-million dollar windfall to protect
the education reform agenda (Wardlaw, 1985). Steimel had good reason to doubt the
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security of high stakes testing in Louisiana’s troubled economy. The following year,
1986, was the worst economic year in Louisiana since the Great Depression. The state
legislature faced at least a $420 million shortfall for the fiscal year 1986-1987 (Wardlaw,
1986). The education trust guaranteed continual funding for education reform, while
lifting the heavier tax burden on businesses that were reluctant to fund public education.
The money would yield revenues in the form of interest, divided equally between BESE
and the Board of Regents, to finance policy-making and governance. The Louisiana
Quality Education Fund gave BESE a vital funding source to finally continue its
standards-based reform agenda.

Summary
School desegregation resulted in significant changes to the social context of
public schooling that planted the seeds for high stakes testing and the LEAP. First,
school desegregation led to swift abandonment of public schools by the White middle
class and high rates of private and parochial school enrollment in the political strongholds
of New Orleans and Baton Rouge. Second, it resulted in more pronounced racial
segregation as Whites depopulated racially mixed areas in favor of racially homogenous
areas in rural and suburban communities. Third, desegregation did little to alter
conventional racist attitudes and public policies toward Black education in Louisiana. As
Black students and teachers repopulated schools deserted by Whites, the traditional
divestment in Black education resumed once a public school became identifiably Black.
Desegregation changed school demographics in the political centers of Baton Rouge and
New Orleans, resulting in waning support and low confidence in the educative value of
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public schools. This poor image heightened skepticism of students’ academic
achievement as evidenced by rising promotion and graduation rates.
Rising graduation rates and poor educational quality in public schools had
become a growing concern for education conservatives in the 1980s, and many states
enacted minimum-competency testing to certify students’ competence. Louisiana acted
in a similar vein, but state leaders became dismayed with students’ relative success in
passing minimum competency tests. Many believed the tests reinforced low educational
standards, raised education costs, and failed to curb social promotion. Elected education
officials such as the State Superintendent and BESE accelerated plans for standardized
curriculum and rigorous testing, drawing upon recommendations issued by the 1983
Nation at Risk report and education taskforces. The central reason for implementing high
stakes testing in Louisiana was the elimination of social promotion, which was viewed as
the cause of incompetency in high school graduates. Desegregation policies and the
equity rationale grew more unpopular in the early 1980s, and the excellence rationale
dominated the new conservative era of American politics. School excellence could be
achieved through rigorous and uniform standards of curriculum and assessment;
Standards-based reform remedied the problems of social promotion, educational quality,
and racial inequity. However, the impending economic recession hampered any
education reform in the state until the Louisiana Quality Education Fund was established
in 1986. Once a continual funding source was created, state education leaders moved
aggressively to implement the LEAP.
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CHAPTER 4
A CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF THE LOUISIANA EDUCATIONAL
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (LEAP)

In the previous chapter, I outlined important sociopolitical factors that drew
Louisiana policymakers to standards-based reform and high stakes testing. These reform
agendas were justified by the excellence rationale, which espoused rigorous student
testing, stringent promotion and graduation guidelines, and elimination of school
desegregation mandates. In this chapter, I examine the lawmaking and policymaking
process that resulted in the LEAP, in particular the actions of Louisiana state officials to
implement the high stakes testing program. The first installment of the LEAP program
was enacted in the state in 1986 and included K-12 assessments aligned to prescriptive
state standards. The law required local school systems to use the LEAP K-8 assessments
to decide student promotion, but school systems did have some flexibility in promotional
decisions based upon specific criteria and the academic needs of individual school
systems. Successful scores on the LEAP high school graduate exit exam, however, were
required as a condition of obtaining a high school diploma in the state. Because the tests
were heavily weighted in student promotion and graduation, the LEAP is considered
Louisiana’s first comprehensive high stakes testing program.
The LEAP was redesigned under state law in 1999 as Leap for the 21st Century
(LEAP 21), the brainchild of Louisiana Governor Murphy “Mike” Foster. Foster, along
with his BESE appointees Paul Pastorek and Leslie Jacobs, advanced a school
accountability policy that tied LEAP test scores to school compensation, faculty and staff
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evaluations, school quality and accreditation, and student promotion and graduation. The
LEAP 21 introduced rigorous testing formats that demanded content mastery as opposed
to competency stressed in earlier LEAP tests. In 2001, Louisiana became the first state to
deny student promotion at the fourth and eighth grade level, and to deny a high school
diploma, to those students who failed the LEAP 21/GEE state assessment (Johnson &
Johnson, 2006). The program received national praise from Education Week in 2004
(Skinner, 2004), but Louisiana locals were divided in their support for the high stakes
testing program. Blacks rallied against the LEAP 21 in public protest and legislative
action, but could not muster the larger political support to stymie the strict accountability
policies associated with the testing program. Educators also complained about the
soaring costs of accountability mandates that contributed to poor teacher pay and
increased teacher responsibilities. State policymakers defended the LEAP 21 as a policy
to raise academic standards for all students, and state officials worked in concert to
develop the LEAP as a high stakes testing program.

LEAP Forward
BESE takes the lead
BESE was created under the 1974 Louisiana Constitution as a corporate entity
with policymaking authority to supervise and manage K-12 education programs. Once
organized, BESE outlined clear intentions for high stakes testing reform; its policymaking activities were often more aggressive than state education laws. Louisiana’s
1977 accountability law, which established the Louisiana State Assessment Program
(LSAP), specifically prohibited school systems from denying promotion or graduation on
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the basis of the state assessment (Official Journal of the State, 1977). Although state
officials publicly praised competency testing to expose and reduce social promotion, and
there was precedent for promotional and graduation tests in states like Florida and
Mississippi, legislators were divided in their political support to use standardized tests as
a basis for promotional decisions (Moore, 1978). Opponents of promotional tests cited
problems in test implementation and constitutionality. Some legislators feared massive
failure rates would deny diplomas to well-deserving students in their districts. Others
questioned the legality of promotional tests and considered the lawsuit pending against
Florida’s 1975 state law that authorized its test-for-graduation requirement. Florida’s
Black students sued under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
argued that past discriminatory policies of both the state and testing companies led
Blacks to disproportionately fail the exit exam. While the Florida case, Debra P. vs.
Turlington (1979), was in litigation, Louisiana legislators decided to implement its testing
program as simply an assessment measure. Despite legislative refrain from promotional
tests, BESE approved a proposal to require all eight graders to pass a basic literacy test
before they could enter high school (Moore, 1978). BESE’s decision occurred in 1978,
the same year the Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) was first administered to
seventh and tenth graders as a standardized assessment independent of promotion and
graduation requirements.
A legislative subcommittee later met with Department of Education officials to
discuss BESE’s eighth-grade promotional test (Moore, 1978). Lawmakers’ concern for
high failure rates resurfaced in the subcommittee talks, but New Orleans legislators
defended BESE and the need for promotional testing. Henry Braden, a veteran White
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Senator from New Orleans, stated that “half of New Orleans graduates lacked
competency at the eighth grade level” (Moore, 1978, p. 35). He sought to expand the
tests’ use by backing a grade-by-grade promotional test for all students at all grade levels.
However, some legislators were reluctant to endorse the promotional test until
information was gathered concerning expected pass/fail rates. BESE’s policy also
overstepped the constitutional language included in the existing Public School
Accountability and Assessment Act, which invited legal challenges to its policy if
approved. The measure was tabled pending further legislative debate. In 1979, Florida
plaintiffs won their suit in Debra P. vs. Turlington (1979) and the test-for-graduation
requirement was ruled unconstitutional. Louisiana legislators were careful to craft
pending high stakes testing legislation to avoid constitutionality issues witnessed in the
Florida case. Senator Braden won his appeal for grade-by-grade proficiency tests in the
following 1979 legislative session, when he sponsored the state’s Competency-Based
Education Law that established the Basic Skills Test (Official Journal of the State, 1979).
The Competency-Based Education Law provided BESE the legislative backing to
implement the grade-by-grade proficiency tests, but the law carefully stipulated that the
tests were to be used as “principal criterion”—not sole criterion—for promotional
decisions. Undeterred from its high stakes testing agenda, BESE authorized Department
of Education officials to attend an invitational symposium in 1981 called “Issues of
Competency and Accountability” (Schechter, 1981). Participants included state officials
in the areas of research, evaluation, and curriculum from Arkansas, Texas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Louisiana’s representative was David Hamilton,
Section Chief of Legislative and Legal Analysis in the Louisiana Department of
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Education. Diana Pullin, the staff attorney for Florida plaintiffs in the Debra P. vs.
Turlington case, was a featured speaker. Pullin advised participants on constitutional
language for minimum-competency testing laws, the validity of criterion-referenced
versus norm-referenced formats in law and policy, the use of standardized curriculum and
textbooks to prevent charges of discrimination, and the importance of establishing a
remediation program (Schecter, 1981, p. 19). Such key advisement on constitutional
issues in high stakes testing was significant to the Department of Education officials and
their development of the LEAP. Also in 1981, BESE asked a district court to clarify its
authority as a self-governing constitutional body rather than an agency of the state
legislature (Johnson, 1995). In Aguilard v. Treen (1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted BESE general powers to set and implement educational policies in compliance
with state law and directives of the state legislature. The court concluded that BESE is
not self-executing and cannot contradict legislative resolutions and statutes in pursuit of
its constitutional powers (Johnson, 1995, p. 187). Specifically, the court ruled that BESE
had power to develop and execute educational policies as long as those policies did not
contradict state laws and regulations.
In 1984 BESE took further action to toughen promotion and graduation guidelines
through state testing following the Nation at Risk report. First, BESE raised the BST
cutoff score from 75 percent to 80 percent in order to increase proficiency requirements
for elementary students. A growing number of BST critics were skeptical of high passing
rates that signaled minimal impact on student promotion. Second, BESE adopted a plan
in early 1984 that increased high school course requirements and standardized a more
rigorous program of study (Loupe, 1984). The plan also included a graduation test in
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which successful scores were required to receive a high school diploma. Both of BESE’s
proposals overstepped the constitutional language used in the existing competency-based
law. BESE’s policy changes occurred in 1984, an election year, and local candidates
popularized standardized curriculum and assessment in their education platforms. Both
State School Superintendent-elect Tom Clausen and Governor-elect Edwin Edwards
pledged to increase academic standards through higher standards and more rigorous
assessments. Soon after he was elected, Superintendent Clausen gathered research
evidence to lobby for a tougher, more comprehensive student assessment program
(Hoffman, 1984), but he received pressure from the state’s largest teachers union to
improve working conditions and pay before a costly reform plan was enforced.
Clausen’s first task became negotiating with BESE to relax some of their policy changes
for increasing and standardizing high school course requirements. The BESE plan was
endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Taskforce on Education, Inc. ,
whose chairman replied in a Times Picayune interview that the changes would yield “a
more literate and competent citizenry” (Roehl, 1984). However, school officials attacked
the BESE plan for its inflexibility, hastiness, and potential for increasing the drop-out
rate. A retired Louisiana educator remembered a meeting at a local school to discuss
BESE’s plans for high school promotion and graduation requirements:
BESE said they were going to change the classes and requirements for high
school students. They said the changes were supposed to help all students get into
college where they could get jobs. But they wanted the changes to go into effect
immediately without giving us [teachers] a chance to prepare students. The
students were capable of doing the work, but to introduce the changes so quickly
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without giving schools time to adjust was just setting the kids up for failure. We
told the Board [BESE] that there were no options for students not considering
college, and I thought it was unfair. (J. Smith, Personal communication, August
21, 2011)
Lobbied heavily by educators and school officials, Clausen proposed an alternative plan
that granted more flexibility to local school systems and students to choose the courses
that would satisfy the English, math, and science requirements. For example, the BESE
plan required three units of Math—Algebra I and II, and Geometry with no substitutions.
The Clausen plan also required three units of Math—Algebra I and two years of either
Algebra II, geometry, trigonometry, general math, business math, or calculus. At a
Louisiana School Supervisors Associations meeting in March 1984, parish school
supervisors were divided over their support for Clausen and BESE (Loupe, 1984). BESE
complained to state legislators and Governor Edwards—who had three appointees to the
BESE board—that the elective office of the State School Superintendent posed confusion
to the public over who held the political authority to set education policy. BESE’s power
struggle with State Superintendent Clausen delayed their plans to redesign high school
curriculum and introduce a graduate exit exam. BESE also had no funding source at the
time and appropriations for the BST were taken out of the Department of Education
budget, which suffered under state budget cuts as the oil crisis continued. Governor
Edwards resolved the major political and financial obstacles for BESE in the following
legislative session, which made BESE’s high stakes testing policies possible.
Governor Edwards Pushes Reform
In his 1984 election campaign, Governor Edwards unveiled an ambitious package
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to reform K-12 education using standardized testing as a centerpiece to the reform
agenda. During a speech in early 1985 to the Louisiana School Boards Association,
Edwards touted expansive reforms that would fundamentally change the entire
educational system (Thibodeaux, 1985, p. 1). His education plan included legislative
proposals to make the State School Superintendent post appointive, award merit pay for
teachers based on licensing exams, establish an education trust fund, secure monies for
student summer remediation, require new administrators to pass a licensing exam,
develop a teacher internship program, provide leadership training for principals, and
replace the BST test with a nationally normed, commercial test for grades 2-11. When
the legislative session opened in April 1985, however, Edwards faced a severe economic
shortfall and imposed spending cuts on all state services (Office of Planning and Budget,
1985). The 1985-1986 state budget lacked monies to finance Edwards’ educational
initiatives, and they were postponed by the financial collapse of the state economy.
Cecil Picard, ranking member of the Senate Education Committee, publicly
chided Edwards for failing to secure legislation to target testing programs for teachers
and students (Thibodeaux, 1985, p. 1). Edwards defended his actions as “political
acumen” in understanding what reforms were essential, economical, and likely to get
passed in a tense political climate (p. 4). He abandoned pricey education packages to
support key constitutional changes that would allow future high stakes testing legislation
to advance. Edwards lobbied heavily for a BESE-appointed State School Superintendent
and to dedicate the “8g” oil settlement funds to the Louisiana Education Trust Fund. The
education trust, placed in an interest-bearing investment account, would yield monies to
finance school reform initiatives in perpetuity. Also, a BESE-appointed State School
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Superintendent would relieve the public pressure on the School Superintendent and
distinguish BESE as the policymaking authority in K-12 education. Edwards’ victories
in the 1985 legislative session were vital to BESE’s ability to authorize and finance an
aggressive school reform agenda. BESE gained about $20 million dollars as the first
payment from the investment account, which it used to shoulder the cost of test
development delayed by the budget crisis. BESE members also welcomed their new
power to appoint the State School Superintendent. Clausen, still embroiled in his power
struggle with BESE, had been admonished by Edwards for lowering the cutoff scores for
the state’s teacher licensing exam. Clausen faced a teacher shortage and heavy lobbying
from teachers unions, but Edwards pushed a legislative resolution against Clausen’s
actions and ruled them inconsistent with higher standards in K-12 education (Honeycutt,
2009). The state’s first appointed State School Superintendent would take office at the
close of Clausen’s term in 1988, and BESE selected William Cody for his replacement.
Cody, a veteran educator from Alabama, introduced an exit exam for eleventh-graders in
his earlier post as Superintendent of Schools in Birmingham (Mckendall & Wardlaw,
1988).
Legislative Power
In the following 1986 legislative session, a renewed sense of urgency pushed
legislators to develop a state testing program that promoted standards, assessments, and
accountability. First, the existing Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) for
secondary students and Basic Skills Test (BST) for elementary grades had not deterred
public concern for social promotion. Results from both testing programs indicated
proficiency levels above 80 percent, yet a key comparative testing study released by the
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Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) placed Louisiana last among their southern
counterparts in academic performance in 1986 (Southern Regional Education Board,
1986). Louisiana’s low scores in the SREB study and NAEP tests substantiated
legislative proposals for immediate and rigorous state testing to enforce academic
improvement in schools. Also, White conservatives lobbied for policies that would
achieve racial equity through school excellence and standards-based reform as opposed to
existing court-ordered desegregation mandates. Finally, Edwards convinced lawmakers
chose to dedicate that substantial oil windfall to an education trust rather than balance a
strained budget, and they were anxious to use those funds to secure a comprehensive
testing reform package. State revenues had declined to their worst levels in 1986, and the
House Appropriations Committee voted to discontinue funding for the BST program and
halt testing administration. The House chose to defer all financing for standards-based
reform initiatives to BESE and the education trust instead of the general fund (Wardlaw,
1986).
As a result of renewed vigor for student testing among legislators, two major bills
regarding high stakes testing circulated in the 1986 legislative session. The first bill, Act
146, established the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as a more
rigorous assessment program to accompany the curriculum standards imposed by the
earlier competency-based education law. The LEAP act was sponsored jointly by
chairman of the Senate Education Committee, Cecil Picard, and chairman of the House
Education Committee, Jimmy Long. First elected to the State Senate in 1979, Picard was
a former teacher and principal in Louisiana’s rural Vermillion parish during the years
1959-1979 (Louisiana Secretary of State List of State Senators since 1880, 2009). He
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retired from school administration upon election to the State Senate, and was hired as a
consultant to a Louisiana petrochemical company. Picard was instrumental in education
lawmaking during the school desegregation era, and concentrated his earlier efforts on
institutionalizing teacher licensing exams and a state teacher evaluation system. In the
previous 1985 legislative session he fought heavily to force all veteran teachers to submit
to a recertification progress and obtain a passing score on the state licensing exam, but
the measure was killed by the state’s largest teachers union (Thibodeax, 1985, p. 1).
Picard was a leading spokesman for standardized testing to assess the competence of both
teachers and students during the desegregation period. Picard’s counterpart in the State
House, Jimmy Long, was first elected in 1968 and served seven consecutive terms
thereafter. A businessman by occupation, Long represented the rural Winn parish of
northwestern Louisiana. He garnered a reputation for being the state’s most powerful
legislator concerning education law. He represented Louisiana on the Southern Regional
Educational Board and the Education Commission of States, the body that first
administered the NAEP testing program in 1969 (Louisiana Secretary of State List of
State Representatives since 1880, 2009).
Together, both chairman Jimmy Long of the House Education Committee and
chairman Cecil Picard of the Senate Education Committee co-sponsored the LEAP law,
which passed with large support from state legislators. In terms of its constitutional
language, the LEAP law differed from earlier laws only regarding the number and type of
assessments that would be administered under the existing the Louisiana CompetencyBased Education program. Act 146 established the Louisiana Educational Assessment
Program (LEAP) as a “process of measuring pupil performance in relation to grade
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appropriate skills, state curriculum standards, and national educational indices” (Official
Journal of the State, 1986, p. 364). The new LEAP program included specific
instructions for a kindergarten assessment to inform student placement according to
ability and readiness; criterion-referenced assessments in grades three, five, and seven
aligned to state curriculum standards approved by BESE and used as principal criterion in
promotion decisions; a national norm-referenced test administered to all students
statewide in at least three grade levels; and an eleventh grade criterion-referenced test.
The new assessments would require student “mastery of the grade appropriate skills”
instead of “minimal competencies” stressed in earlier education laws (p. 366). The law
further indicated that student promotion “shall be based upon student performance on a
criterion-referenced test on grade appropriate skills as defined by the state curriculum”
(p. 366). Like earlier testing programs, the law stated that “other factors shall be
considered” in student promotion and school officials had ultimate authority in
promotional decisions based on BESE-approved pupil progression plans (p. 367). The
law was carefully worded to refrain from language that would expressly prohibit or
require school systems to deny promotion or graduation based on students’ test results. It
contained clear and urgent directives that test development should begin immediately.
Pilot testing for the LEAP K-8 assessments were scheduled for the same year 1986-1987,
with implementation to begin the following 1987-1988 school year. Pilot testing for the
LEAP eleventh grade test was scheduled to begin in 1987-1988, with implementation to
begin no later than 1988-1989 school year.
Other important components of the LEAP law was the stipulation that all students
who failed LEAP tests would receive remedial education programs according to BESE
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regulations, and the provision to establish the Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing
Commission to serve as advisor to BESE regarding the state assessments. The
membership of the 16-person Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission
was specifically outlined to include a representative from all the major professional
teacher organizations/unions, House Education committee, Senate Education committee,
BESE, Board of Regents, Louisiana School Boards Association, Louisiana School
Principals Association, Louisiana Association of School Superintendents, parent of a
public school student (appointed by BESE), an interested citizen (appointed by BESE),
and a college/university dean of education (appointed by BESE). According to the law,
the Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission was empowered to
“recommend procedures for conducting, maintaining, and reporting reliable
accountability measures of student performance” (Official Journal of the State, 1986, p.
367). A member of the original Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission
reported political pressure to implement the testing program immediately, before there
was even a remediation plan for failing students,
A major focus of the LEAP commission was setting and approving the structures
that would encompass the LEAP. There was political pressure to put the system
in place immediately, and such a policy required careful deliberation. I remember
BESE appointed everyone on the commission and much of our discussion was
based on whatever they had in mind. Also, a major concern was that BESE had
no plans for failing students. There was a sense that failing students would
probably drop out and that it was okay because they were not deserving of the
high school diploma. (B. Road Personal communication, August 22, 2011)
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Lawmakers included the Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission
in the constitutional language of the LEAP law because it was an assurance to educators
that they would have input in crafting LEAP policies for students and schools. However,
most of the members who served on the commission were named by BESE, which gave
BESE members the most critical voice in shaping LEAP policy. The LEAP law
represented Louisiana’s model of standards-based reform by requiring students to master
rigorous curriculum standards and assessments as opposed to basic skills knowledge. It
carefully outlined a plan for rigorous standardized assessments to enhance the existing
legislation on the competency-based law, but it did not specify punitive consequences for
schools. There were high stakes only for students, whose promotion at key grade levels
was now based on successful test scores on a LEAP test that required content mastery as
opposed to basic skills. The law also did not specify a student remediation plan, but
indicated that remediation would be offered to failing students. The ambiguity within the
law made it unclear if remediation funds were the responsibility of the state in their
annual budget, BESE, the Department of Education, or local school systems. The law
was vague in outlining who would finance student remediation, which created a political
football over who would shoulder the costs of remediating failing students.

The LEAP Exit Exam
As the LEAP bill neared passage in 1986, another bill requiring a graduation exit
exam was proposed by state representative B.F. O’Neal (United Press International, p. B2). The bill would award a high school diploma to those students who passed the
graduation test. Failing students would receive a certificate of attendance rather than a
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diploma. The measure passed the Senate Education Committee but it was later rejected
by the full Senate. In the following 1987 legislative session, O’Neal proposed another
bill to make the LEAP eleventh grade test a criterion for graduation (Hargroder &
Anderson, 1987, p. 22). O’Neal, a state representative from the northern city of
Shreveport, introduced the bill as an accountability measure that would certify the
competence of all high school graduates. The bill passed the state House but halted in the
Senate Education Committee due to a tiebreaker vote made by a Black state senator from
New Orleans (Hargroder & Anderson, 1987, p. 22). Senator Dennis Bagneris was
elected to the State Senate in 1983 and was vice-chairman of the Senate Education
Committee. He was also a member of the Legislative Black Caucus, whose membership
rose along with Black voting power following the civil rights movement. Bagneris
succeeded in preventing legislation for a LEAP graduation test to move forward, and no
other proposals surfaced in the state legislature afterward.
BESE began piloting the LEAP eleventh grade test in the 1987-1988 school year,
and scheduled the first test administration in 1988-1989 under its new appointed State
School Superintendent William Cody. The following year 1990, BESE set an
administrative rule making the LEAP eleventh grade test a graduation requirement even
though the measure failed to pass in the state legislature three years earlier (Johnson,
1995). The LEAP eleventh grade test was renamed the Graduate Exit Exam (GEE) and
made applicable to all BESE-approved schools—both public and non-public. Private and
parochial K-12 schools vigorously lobbied the state legislature to argue that BESE lacked
constitutional authority to enforce such policy directives on non-public schools. Under
its statutory powers set forth by Aguilard v. Treen (1982), state legislators passed a
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concurrent resolution exempting non-public students from the GEE and LEAP testing
(Johnson, 1995). Those students exempted from the GEE were students enrolled in
private or parochial schools, home-schooled students, students who receive a General
Education Diploma (GED), and students who matriculate from a non-public school but
enroll in a public school in their high school years (Johnson, 1995, p. 188). BESE
members were divided over the legislative resolution to exclude non-public students, and
some members argued that fairness demanded an all-or-nothing approach (Wardlaw,
1990). Board member Huel Perkins of Baton Rouge called the proposed graduation test
“inherently racist” in a BESE meeting following the legislative resolution
(Wardlaw, 1990, 1). He continued that public school demographics indicated that Black
schoolchildren would be more likely to succumb to the test than White schoolchildren
who were exempt in non-public schools. Carson Killen of Gonzalez agreed that an
uneven testing policy would single out public school students unfairly, and he introduced
a proposal to make the test optional to non-public students. In the end, members Killen
and Perkins represented the minority among the BESE board and the Killen proposal was
denied. BESE acquiesced to the state legislature by revising their position on non-public
students in the 1990 Louisiana Handbook for School Administrators (Standard 2.099.00,
Bulletin 741). Only public school students would be subject to the graduation exit exam.
When the GEE requirement was implemented in 1993, Black parents in New
Orleans filed suit against BESE in Rankins vs. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education (1993). Using a similar argument raised in Florida’s Debra P. vs.
Turlington (1981), plaintiffs charged the GEE violated the equal protection clause by
establishing unequal rules for obtaining a high school diploma in the state of Louisiana
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(Johnson, 1995). They argued that state aid to non-public schools—which had risen to an
estimated $20 million in 1986—substantiated their claim that non-public schools should
submit to the GEE as well as public schools. Plaintiffs continued that bias in test designs
and development often produced racial disparities in test scores, which would
disadvantage Black students otherwise qualified to graduate. A New Orleans district
court agreed with plaintiffs, finding that the GEE was unfairly and discriminately
administered (Johnson, 1995, p. 189).
BESE President James Stafford vowed his support for a court appeal to reverse
the lower court decision that made the GEE unconstitutional. He defended the GEE as a
measure for ensuring higher academic standards in Louisiana public schools. A divided
BESE Board met in early 1993 to vote on a decision to appeal the Rankins case (Coyle &
Wardlaw, 1993). BESE’s only Black member, Keith Johnson of New Orleans,
unsuccessfully sided with the minority vote to discontinue the GEE out of fairness to
public school students and respect to the judicial decision. In a split 6-5 vote, BESE
voted to appeal the Rankins decision in the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals.
Publicly, Governor Edwards did not offer any comment on the graduation test and stated
that he wanted to show respect for BESE’s authority in setting educational policy.
However, all three of Edwards’ appointees to the BESE board voted to appeal the
Rankins decision, which signaled Edwards’ commanding role in safeguarding the GEE
from legal challenges.
A year later BESE won their appeal in Rankins, and the appeals court found that
BESE did not exceed its constitutional authority because “the statute is devoid of
legislative intent regarding graduation exit exams” (637 So. 2d pg. 555). In the absence
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of specific legislation against the GEE or certain provisions associated, the court held that
BESE is constitutionally empowered to implement the exam as the governing board for
elementary and secondary education. The appeals court maintained that BESE possessed
power only to approve non-public schools but lacked authority to enforce its policy
directives in schools protected by religious freedom (i.e. Catholic schools). The court did
not address homeschooled students, GED students, or non-religious private schools who
were also exempt from the GEE. In regard to the equal protection challenge, the court
found that unlike the Debra P. case, BESE’s GEE was a criterion-referenced test aligned
to a state curriculum required for all students in all schools under all conditions. Because
test development was not based on social or nonacademic factors, but rather on a
disclosed set of curricula, test bias was an insufficient claim to establish an equal
protection violation (Johnson, 1995, p. 187-190). Subsequently, both the Louisiana
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied later applications for a writ
of certiorari to review the decision made by the appeals court.
Louisiana’s dual system of graduation requirements remained a contentious issue
that divided communities along both racial and class lines. Unlike the LEAP K-8
assessments, the GEE was inflexible in granting local school officials some influence in
awarding high school diplomas. The GEE was a five-part examination that included
separate assessments in English, math, science, social studies, and writing. Students had
to successfully pass all five parts to receive the high school diploma. The LEAP act does
include student remediation in its constitutional language, but the law does not clearly
establish the agency responsible for financing remediation. The Louisiana Educational
Assessment Testing Commission was successful in pressing state education officials for a
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remediation plan before the first administration of the LEAP test (Associated Press,
November 1988), but local school systems increasingly absorbed these costs. A
remediation program was critically important at this juncture the because the graduate
exit exam was an inflexible policy that denied a high school diploma to any failing
student. Increasingly, local school systems were saddled with expensive remediation
programs that pinched strained budgets in the economic recession.
Despite these criticism of the GEE, the LEAP program remained relatively
consistent over the next ten years. The LEAP program replaced minimum-competency
testing with rigorous K-12 assessments that required content mastery. BESE defended the
GEE as a necessary tool to prevent social promotion and guarantee graduates who were
capable of succeeding in college and professional employment. The high stakes fell
mainly on students, whose promotion and graduation were largely based on the LEAP
tests. About ten percent of students each year were denied their high school diplomas as
a result of the GEE, and Blacks represented about 80 percent of these GEE failures
(Bankston & Caldas, 2002). Although the failure rate was greater in the LEAP K-8
assessments, school systems were flexible in their decision to promote students based on
factors that included classroom performance and teacher recommendation. By 1996,
however, the new Louisiana governor Murphy “Mike” Foster revived the excellence
rationale to seek tougher accountability policies for the LEAP K-8 assessments.

LEAP for the 21st Century (LEAP 21)
Mike Foster and his school accountability czars
As governor, Edwin Edwards wielded significant power in the state’s K-12
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education program and the LEAP was created under his leadership. Edwards was
succeeded by Republican Governor Murphy “Mike” Foster in 1996, and Foster’s
educational vision really crafted the LEAP into a weapon for school accountability.
Foster was born in Franklin, Louisiana as the son of a wealthy sugar planter and owner of
oil and gas lands. Foster’s father, Murphy Foster, Jr., was a former Louisiana governor
and United States Senator. Foster grew up on his family’s sugar cane plantation near
Shreveport, Louisiana. He entered politics at the age of 57 as a Louisiana State Senator
in 1987. While serving his second term as state senator, he ran a successful campaign for
Governor and eventually served two terms (1996-2004). He campaigned on a
conservative platform, promising to reduce aid to welfare programs, end affirmative
action and racial quotas, and toughen criminal justice laws (Dictionary of Louisiana
Biography, 2008; Williams, 2004).
Foster was endorsed by Ku Klux Klan member David Duke in 1995, and Foster
pled guilty to an ethics violation for paying $150,000 to Duke for a mailing list of Duke’s
supporters (La Campaign Finance Opinion No. 99 – 360). The National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) protested Foster’s immediate end to
statewide affirmative action programs after his election, and they marched outside the
Governor’s Mansion in early 1996. A White-rights group, the National Association for
the Advancement of White People, rallied on the same day in support of Foster (Shuler,
1996, 1). A pro-business governor, Foster sought tax decreases for the business
community and policies to increase profitability within the state. He also changed the
state’s grant program to college students, the Tuition Opportunity Program for Students
(TOPS), so that eligibility was based on merit (GPA and test scores) as opposed to
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financial need.
In his first election, Foster sought total gubernatorial control of BESE and
campaigned for an appointed Board. “The buck will stop with me and my appointees.
That can't happen with a BESE board that's mostly elected - no matter how fine the
people who end up on it," said Foster to the Baton Rouge newspaper The Advocate in
1995 (The Advocate, October 1995). He argued that an elected board would be more
accountable to their constituents and a hindrance to his bold school accountability agenda
that pushed sanctions against failing schools and school systems. Foster’s threats to
BESE members were genuine, and he found legislative support to abolish BESE in his
first term. In both the 1995 and 1997 state legislative sessions, House bills were
introduced to reduce BESE to an advisory body and make the state superintendent postappointive by the governor (The Advocate, June 1995). After meetings with Foster and
his staff, BESE members pledged support to Foster’s policies for high stakes testing in
elementary grades, penalties and sanctions against schools and teachers, and strict
oversight into low-performing school districts.
Unlike Edwards, who appointed teachers and educators to BESE in his tenure,
Foster’s BESE appointees were business and law professionals with no classroom
experience. Paul Pastorek, an appointee of Foster in 1996, became President of BESE in
2002 and later appointed by BESE to State School Superintendent in 2007 (Louisiana
Public Broadcasting, 2011). A corporate attorney, Pastorek began practicing law in 1979
as a litigator specializing in corporate and transactional law. For nearly thirty years
Pastorek has been an attorney with the law firm of Adams & Reese, one of largest firms
in the southeastern United States. He is a longstanding member of the New Orleans
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Chamber of Commerce and currently serves as the chairman of the New Orleans
Regional Chamber of Commerce Area Council Executive Committee. He also serves on
the Board of Directors for the Chamber of Commerce Greater Baton Rouge and the
World Trade Center of New Orleans. During his tenure on BESE, Pastorek played an
integral role in the executive decision-making to utilize LEAP in order to evaluate,
accredit, and penalize low-performing schools and districts. He was a member of
Louisiana’s LEARN Commission (1996) that supervised standards and curriculum
reform, a member of Louisiana’s Public School and District Accountability Commission
(1996-1999), and a member of Louisiana’s Task Force on Community and Vocational
Technical Colleges (1997-1998). He created the nonprofit Next Horizon as a statewide
education think tank when he left BESE in 2004 (Louisiana Public Broadcasting, 2011).
In 2007 BESE appointed Pastorek as the State School Superintendent and he was given
the highest salary of any State School Superintendent throughout the entire Gulf Coast
(Maloney, 2008).
Leslie Jacobs, dubbed as the architect of school accountability in Louisiana, was
also a 1996 Foster appointee and Vice-President of the Board in 2008. Born in New
Orleans, she worked as an insurance executive at The Rosenthal Agency for three
decades, and became President of the merged Hibernia Rosenthal Insurance when the
company was purchased by Hibernia National Bank in 2000. She entered educational
policymaking in 1992 as an elected member of the Orleans Parish School Board. She
served on the Orleans Parish School board until 1996, when she was appointed to BESE
by Governor Foster. In her final years as BESE member she served as the Board’s Vice
President. Jacobs is credited with the successful implementation of the Recovery School
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District, which is designed to take over the supervisory and budgetary management of
failing schools. The Recovery School District recruits charter school operators,
educational management organizations (EMOs), and other private sector organizations to
operate predominantly underachieving, low-income Black schools in New Orleans.
Jacobs, regarded by many as the architect for school choice and competition in Louisiana,
used failing LEAP scores and school accountability sanctions to overtake public schools
and transfer control to private companies (Educate Now!, 2011).
Not only did Foster obtain pledged support from BESE members in enacting his
strict school accountability platform, his appointees assumed Board leadership to assure
Foster’s vision would be a preeminent focus. Three years into Foster’s first term, he was
so pleased with BESE that he publicly praised the Board for leading the nation in strict
accountability policies and took measures to expand BESE’s power.
The Foster Plan
Foster embraced two elements in his education platform: high stakes testing and
school accountability based on rewards and sanctions for academic performance. Soon
after his 1996 election, Foster and State School Superintendent Raymond Arveson
organized a 23-member Louisiana LEARN commission to study educational issues and
develop a plan for policy reform. Foster’s educational package drew upon the
commission’s recommendations, which he unveiled during a televised news conference
that aired on Louisiana Public Broadcasting stations around the state (Shuler, 1996).
Foster acknowledged that both good and bad schools could be found throughout the state,
but believed the key to improving bad schools was sanctions against them. Foster
identified bad schools as those with poor LEAP test scores and high rates of failure on the
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GEE. According to Foster’s news conference, these schools were bastions of persistent
underachievement that should be held accountable to taxpayers and the students they
serve. Foster’s education policy would reward schools with proven records of academic
achievement and sanction those who failed to improve student academic performance on
the LEAP. Low-performing schools would face financial sanctions, closure, takeover by
a state-approved management agency, or obligatory student transfer to other public
schools or private schools of greater quality. The LEAP K-12 assessments were integral
to Foster’s school accountability policy because school quality was judged on LEAP test
scores. Each school would receive a School Performance Score (SPS) as an annual
quality rating (Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011). Ninety-percent of the SPS at the
elementary level was based on the LEAP K-8 assessments. At the high school level the
GEE passing rate and high school graduation rate accounted for ninety percent of the
SPS. It is important to note that since high school students cannot graduate without
passing the GEE, the exit exam is an inherent factor in high school graduation rates
(Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011). Another important element of Foster’s education
package was redesigning the LEAP assessments to increase their difficulty and
proficiency levels. Leslie Jacobs, member of the LEARN commission and later chairman
of Foster’s K-12 education transition team, expressed concern for grade inflation in
public schools to Baton Rouge’s Advocate in 1996. She stated that too many students
with high GPAs were failing the GEE or required to take remedial courses in college.
She wanted the GEE test redesigned to contain tougher questions to reflect high
expectations that the state had for student learning (Myers, 1996). Foster echoed these
sentiments in his televised news conference and argued that the grade-appropriate skills
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stressed in the LEAP assessment actually assessed minimum skill levels. To increase
Louisiana student performance in national rankings, state assessments should demand
rigorous testing and higher proficiency levels to determine cutoff scores (Shuler, 1996).
Like his predecessor, Foster was unable to secure enough legislative support to
appropriate additional monies to the Department of Education that would finance his
education plan during the 1997 legislative session. His plan entailed rewarding highperforming schools with financial bonuses, developing tougher tests, and shouldering
costs for student remediation—all expensive policies for an unpopular public school
system (Myers, 1997). Both the Department of Education and the Minimum Foundation
Program, which is the state school financing program, was funded through the annual
state budget controlled by the state legislature. Proceeds from the education trust were
awarded to BESE during Edwards’ gubernatorial leadership to finance their
policymaking activities. Beyond the education trust and the Minimum Foundation
Program from the state’s general fund, there was little political backing to appropriate
more monies to an embattled public school system. In 1998, Foster’s accountability
program gained greater support after the release of key education rankings and national
test comparisons reveal Louisiana’s dismal student performance. In 1997, Education
Week covered Louisiana’s public educational system and noted lagging academic
achievement comparable to other states around the country (Lawton, 1997). Louisiana’s
1994 NAEP test scores were tied with California for the lowest reading scores on the
NAEP tests. Louisiana had the highest proportion of students—60 percent—that could
not reach the basic level (p. 117). An interesting note about the NAEP scores is that the
1994 test scores were worse than the 1992 NAEP test scores, which signaled a drop in
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students who scored at the proficient level and an increase in those students scoring at the
basic level. In addition, Louisiana’s ACT scores remained stagnant and below the
national average from 1994 to 1997, fueling calls for even tougher standards and
assessments (Shipley, 1997). In 1998 BESE released a report indicating that about 2
percent of Louisiana’s high school students were denied their high school diplomas
because they failed the GEE. The report indicated that most students who were denied
their high school diplomas failed to obtain the necessary course credits to graduate. The
highest number of GEE failures were in New Orleans and East Baton Rouge parishes,
which also had the highest number of students who had not accumulated enough credits
to graduate. This admission by BESE brought the LEAP/GEE tests into the forefront and
revived old fears that the tests did not enforce school accountability necessary to prevent
social promotion (Myers, 1998).
In the 1999 legislative session, Foster was able to convince state legislators to
renew a state sales tax that would fund his educational investments to the Department of
Education and propel his education plan forward. He pushed LEAP 21 legislation to
revise the Public School Accountability Act that would require all fourth and eighth
graders to pass the LEAP test in order advance to the next grade. All LEAP/GEE tests
were redesigned to reflect the highest cutoff scores and proficiency levels in efforts to
improve academic achievement. A key piece of the legislation was the School
Performance Scores (SPS) to allow parents and communities to publicly compare schools
to rate educational quality or lack thereof. In 1999, when the new LEAP tests were first
administered in public schools, one of Foster’s aides told Baton Rouge’s The Advocate
that the new LEAP eighth grade tests were more rigorous than the current high school
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exam (The Advocate, August 1999). About 44,000 fourth and eighth graders failed the
new high stakes tests in the first 1999 spring administration. Nearly one-third of
students, or about 38,000, failed the tests in the 2000 spring administration (Johnson &
Johnson, 2006). The LEAP 21 program advanced very stringent accountability policies
to end social promotion in schools and improve Louisiana’s rankings. It removed total
decision-making power from teachers and local officials and legitimized unequal funding
to state schools based on test scores. In May 2008, the steady and massive number of
student failures prompted state officials to change the all or nothing policy by permitting
waivers and appeals (Sentell, 2008).

Summary
Although Louisiana’s first state testing program ended in 1933, state leaders
increasingly relied on standardized testing to maintain de facto segregation in the postBrown era. Standardized tests became a popular method of limiting the number of Black
applicants seeking transfer to desegregated White schools. Once organized as a
constitutional body in 1974, the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE)
took immediate action to enforce a comprehensive state testing policy that would limit
student promotion to high school. In 1978, BESE authorized an eighth-grade functional
literacy test for all students as a prerequisite to high school admission. Students who did
not pass the literacy test were limited to a middle-school education and could not be
promoted to high school. BESE’s promotional test was more aggressive than the existing
Louisiana State Assessment Program, which assessed basic literacy skills for high school
students without impacting student promotion or graduation. The eighth-grade
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promotional test was tabled by state legislators, who were divided over their support for
the test until more information was collected on demographic data related to passing and
failure rates. Veteran New Orleans state legislators particularly lobbied on behalf of
BESE’s promotional tests, and the Basic Skills Test was approved for all students as a
principal criterion of student promotion in 1979. Following the Nation at Risk report,
BESE sought to implement a high school graduation test in conjunction with increased
course requirements for high school students. BESE’s graduation test was delayed due to
a divided state legislature and lack of financial resources, but Governor Edwin Edwards
laid important foundations for high stakes testing in 1986.
Governor Edwards particularly supported BESE’s reform agenda, and he enacted
critical policies that allowed high stakes testing to take root in Louisiana. Edwards
secured a consistent funding source for BESE through the education trust, placed the
School Superintendent under BESE’s authority, and was a decisive voice in the legal
challenge to BESE’s graduate exit exam (GEE). These developments allowed BESE to
move forward with their plans for more rigorous testing and assessments geared at
reducing social promotion. Lawmakers strengthened the existing laws for competencybased education by increasing the proficiency level students had to reach in order to pass
the state tests. The new proficiency requirements were announced in the 1986 LEAP
law, which established the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as a
comprehensive K-12 student assessment program that required students to attain content
mastery of course curricula instead of basic skills. The LEAP did not specify student
consequences for failure, but state tests were still regarded as the principal criterion in
student promotion. After ten years of LEAP testing, Louisiana’s new Governor Mike
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Foster, Jr. introduced LEAP for the 21st century to promote school accountability. The
LEAP 21 established an aggressive accountability framework where schools were
rewarded or sanctioned based on students’ LEAP scores. The tests themselves were also
redesigned to require students’ content mastery according to national, norm-referenced
indices. Massive student failures accompanied the LEAP 21 tests, which resulted in
unequal funding allocations to schools and school systems throughout the state.
There are several implications of the LEAP program for Louisiana students and
schools. Because of Louisiana’s large private and parochial school attendance rates, the
LEAP’s punitive consequences primarily befell poor families with limited options for
schooling and education. Second, due to the Whites’ boycotting of desegregated schools,
Blacks are more concentrated in public schools and form the majority of K-8 public
schoolchildren (Bankston & Caldas, 2002). Louisiana’s Black population is just over 30
percent, which is a higher percentage than other states throughout the country. The Black
public school population amounts to about half of all Louisiana public school students,
and Louisiana’s Black student population is double the national average (National Center
for Education Statistics State Education Data Profiles, 2010). Black public school
students especially outnumber Whites in the urban cities of New Orleans and Baton
Rouge, where Blacks represented 90 percent of public school students during the 1990s
(Bankston & Caldas, 2002). As a result, Blacks are more greatly impacted by demands
for school accountability. Lastly, the LEAP policies and laws are vague in their
description of funding to meet accountability mandates and provide student remediation.
Increasingly, local school systems bore the costs of accountability mandates, which left
many schools systems more financially destitute.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS

In 2001, Johnson & Johnson (2006) completed a yearlong study in a rural
Louisiana elementary school to investigate the effects of LEAP 21. Using “thick
description” qualitative methods, the researchers obtained a one-year teaching post at
Redbud Elementary School and took copious notes of their daily activities. Seeking an
insider or “emic” perspective on LEAP 21, the researchers examined several implications
for teaching and learning in a high stakes testing environment. The authors describe
Redbud Elementary School as a dilapidated facility lacking in even basic resources such
as a working telephone in the main office (p. xviii). Although most of the teachers were
White, students were predominantly poor and Black. Teachers practiced “regulated
teaching,” or pedagogy in which scripted curriculum guides indicate a specific curricular
focus, instructional concepts, assignments, materials, and pacing for each lesson. Because
of LEAP 21, curriculum standards increased from the previous year and limited
instructional time to study the prescribed curricula in-depth. Teachers spent much of
their time preparing students for the LEAP 21 tests; little instructional resources were
used beyond test preparation books, supplements, and computer programs.
In piercing detail, Johnson & Johnson (2006) describe narrowed curriculum,
intensive test drills, underfunding, overworked teachers, student anxieties, smart and
capable students, but only minimal student learning at Redbud Elementary. When
students’ test results were released at the end of the school year, about 74 percent of
Redbud fourth graders failed either one or both of the LEAP 21 English/Language Arts or
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LEAP 21 Math tests, and faced retention unless the students could pass the tests in a
summer makeup administration (Johnson & Johnson, 2006, p. 165). Statewide about 42
percent of all fourth graders failed to pass the required LEAP 21 tests and faced
automatic retention (p. 165). The Redbud study illustrates the implications of high stakes
testing for poor and underachieving schools in Louisiana, whose entire school culture is
engrossed in test preparation and remediation. The study exposes the limitations of
regulated teaching and packed curriculum that creates a stressful learning environment
for students and teachers. Importantly, the Redbud study indicates that intensive high
stakes testing actually does little to improve student achievement, as reflected by
students’ dismal test scores in spite of relentless test preparation.
According to interviews with teachers and students present when LEAP and
LEAP 21 were first announced, the Redbud study examines one facet of the high stakes
testing program. Participants also identified other significant implications of the LEAP
that exacerbated perennial problems within Louisiana’s educational system. First, the
LEAP accentuated the class disparity between non-public school students and public
school students. The LEAP contributed to a decrease in public school enrollment during
the 1990s, and deepened the existing class divide between non-public and public schools.
Second, local school systems had to absorb much of the LEAP test preparation and
remediation costs. Lastly, the LEAP instigated racial politics in public education policy
considered part and parcel of Louisiana’s educational history. For many Blacks, the
timing of the 1986 LEAP law and corresponding GEE signaled an attempt to use
achievement tests to undermine Black educational progress during the desegregation
period. The LEAP 21 rigorous accountability program, coupled by the fact that it was
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spearheaded by Mike Foster, raised more suspicion within the Black community
regarding the tests’ usefulness in improving public education for thousands of Black
students in public schools.

The Wealth Gap in Louisiana Schools
During the 1998 legislative session, lawmakers questioned rising public education
costs despite a 10-year decline in public school enrollment (Myers, 1998). Education
officials attributed the costs to additional school personnel, whose numbers had grown
exponentially in recent years to comply with accountability mandates. The LEAP was
enacted in 1986, and every year thereafter one employee had been added to the state
payroll for every two students lost (Sentell, 2003, p. 1). In 1986 the state’s public schools
had 792, 831 students and 86,379 employees. The number of public school students
dropped by about 27,448 in the period 1986-1997, but the number of school workers
increased by half that amount (p. 1). About 16 percent of Louisiana’s elementary and
students were found in private schools by 1998, placing Louisiana third in the nation for
private school enrollment (National Center for Educational Statistics, 1999). Louisiana
also ranked number one in the nation for the largest number of dropouts per total student
enrollment (National Center for Educational Statistics, 1999). By 2003 Louisiana public
school student enrollment dipped again to about 699,000. The percentage of private
school students remained at about 15 percent of all students, but the number of homeschooled students and drop-outs increased significantly (Sentell, 2003). Louisiana’s
public school enrollment in the years following the LEAP diverged from national trends
in public school attendance. In the period of 1990-2000 Louisiana public students
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declined by 5 percent, but public school enrollment rose nationwide by 9 percent during
the same period (Sentell, 2003).
As earlier noted, Louisiana experienced a sharp decline in public school
enrollment following school desegregation in 1960. The number of public school
students continued to decline throughout the 1990s, which exasperated the wealth gap
between non-public and public schools in Louisiana. Nonpublic school enrollment rose
to 22 percent for Whites and 5 percent for Blacks during the 1990s, representing about
one-third of Louisiana students (Bankston & Caldas, 2002, p. 146). The rise in private
and parochial school attendance rates made Louisiana’s dual educational system more
entrenched within the state. Poor and lower classes became increasingly concentrated in
public schools, whereas wealthy classes were increasingly concentrated in non-public
schools. By the year 2000, about 66 percent of all public school students were receiving
free or reduced lunch and labeled “economically disadvantaged” in the state records of
student demographics (Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011). In the major cities of New
Orleans and Baton Rouge, the rate of economically disadvantaged students reached 90
percent (Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011).
Because there is a much higher concentration of Louisiana’s poor families in
public schools, they are more adversely impacted by the punitive consequences
associated with LEAP test scores. It is important to note the excellence rationale that
supported high stakes testing in Louisiana embraced an egalitarian and populist message.
Governor Edwards, Superintendent Clausen, and BESE President James Stafford all
defended the LEAP as a tool for raising academic achievement for all Louisiana students
regardless of social circumstances. Likewise, Governor Foster and BESE Vice-President
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Leslie Jacobs popularized the LEAP 21 as a rigorous testing program to raise academic
achievement in those students and schools with persistent academic underperformance.
However, these state officials developed the LEAP and associated policies with an
understanding that the high stakes testing program would largely impact poorer and
working class families. Although promoted as an equitable policy to enforce all students
to attain high standards, the LEAP’s rigorous curriculum, testing, and demands on
teachers and schools are largely enforced on poor students and families. The large
failures rates on LEAP 21 signal a massive problem in which predominantly poor
students are denied promotion and graduation because they cannot afford educational
options where they are exempt from high stakes testing. This educational structure
creates restrictions on promotion and graduation for Louisiana’s poor and working
classes that do not act as a barrier for many middle and upper class families.
To illustrate the widening class rift in Louisiana’s educational structure and its
effects on poorer children in public schools, a New Orleans teacher shared her
experiences,
The LEAP graduation test was not a major concern because almost everyone
passed in the beginning. I know one person whose child could not pass and the
parents immediately withdrew the student and sent her to a Catholic school. This
was about 1994. The LEAP exit exam became more difficult later on, and we had
lots of students who failed one or more parts. By then we had poorer students
whose parents could not afford to send them elsewhere. There was more pressure
on these students to work while attending school, but once they had failed the
LEAP, they just continued working and never came back. (H. Lane, Personal
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communication, 2011)
Another layer to the class divide in Louisiana schools is the power of the middle class in
setting policies for the majority poorer classes in public schools. The middle class plays a
larger role in shaping educational policy and discourse in the state that is sometimes
contrary to the political voice of the poorer classes and their struggle for socio-economic
mobility. A teacher in rural Lafayette explained that high stakes testing in Louisiana
developed as a consequence of middle-class families at the helm of decision-making.
She saw the LEAP as a policy advanced by the middle class and more of a directive for
the poor masses in the public schools,
A lot of people are still upset that only public school students have to take these
tests and teachers have no say at all in student promotion. The state decided that
rule and they did so because a lot of those state officials don’t have kids in public
schools. That’s the problem. Those running the schools have no vested interest in
the public schools getting better. They create policies that are both inflexible and
unrealistic given the circumstances of public school students. (T. Howard,
Personal communication, October 29, 2011)
These two teachers point to a class divide that became an increasing problem in
Louisiana as a result of its high stakes testing program. A middle class boycott of public
schools can be problematic when school policy and financing decisions are largely made
by middle class citizens. The decision to implement the LEAP in nonpublic schools was
met with vigorous opposition in the state legislature, but the same legislators agreed to
such a policy for public school students. High stakes testing may not have taken root in
Louisiana if it was a truly universal policy in which all students, regardless of social
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class, were subjected to the punitive consequences associated with student accountability.

High Costs and Strained Budgets
In 2004 Education Week awarded Louisiana its top rating for standards and
accountability, but graded the state a “D” in school financing and allocation of funds
(Skinner, 2004). BESE is charged with developing the state financing formula, the
Minimum Foundation Formula, to determine the estimated costs of providing “a
minimum foundation program of education for all elementary and secondary schools”
(LA Const., Art. VIII, § 13). BESE estimates annual educational costs to finance the
Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) and submits this amount for approval from the
state legislature. The state legislature appropriates monies for the MFP in the state budget
each year. Since 2000, the annual costs for educational programs are partly financed by
the state and by each locality. The MFP formula requires local school systems to supply
35 percent of their education costs and the state pays 65 percent. Failure to provide the
local support share will result in a proportionate percentage reduction in state aid.
Additionally, state law requires that 70 percent of MFP funding to local school systems
are dedicated to classroom instruction (teacher salary and retirement benefits, materials,
and instructional aides). This financing model leaves just 30 percent of MFP shared
among local schools to finance administrator salaries and benefits, utilities, supplies,
maintenance, and extra-curricular activities. From fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 2002
MFP appropriations grew by $664 million (Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget,
2003, p. 35). Much of the increase in school financing from 1992 to 2002 were
earmarked for cost-of-living pay raises and increases in school personnel. Accountability
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mandates lead to an increase in hired specialists, special education teachers, consultants,
administrators, and training programs, which absorb the increases in the Minimum
Foundation Program at the local level. These data indicate that there has been very little
increased funding to local schools when LEAP and LEAP 21 were implemented, despite
the rigorous curriculum and punitive consequences the tests imposed.
In fact, local schools receive even less funding for operating expenses because
they have to finance student remediation to meet the state’s rigorous testing demands.
Much of the appropriations for student remediation were contingent upon the availability
of funds in the state budget. For example, the state was supposed to open testing
remediation centers statewide to provide remediation for students who failed the BST,
but appropriations were made for only one year and local school systems bore the costs
for summer remediation thereafter (Schechter, 1981). When BESE first proposed a high
school exit exam in 1984 to accompany their more rigorous program of study, New
Orleans shouldered the costs of summer school remediation for about 3000 of its underachieving high school students who had scored poorly on a basic skills test administered
earlier in the school year (Hodge, 1984). Costs for the program totaled $312,000, which
was a hefty price for the cash-strapped school system. In 1986, the year the LEAP law
was enacted, St. Tammany Parish Schools lost significant state aid due to budget cuts.
The system lost over $250,000 for student remediation on the existing BST program and
almost $300,000 from their MFP financing (Haley, 1986). In fact all school systems lost
monies in their MFP financing in 1986-87. The year 1986-87 was the worst economic
year of the oil crisis and the total MFP was cut by about $18 million in the state budget.
Although the education trust was established also in 1986, BESE gained the interest from
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the oil settlement to finance its policymaking and governing efforts. The education trust
financed high stakes testing reforms but did not fund increases in the MFP to finance
local schools. When the Foster administration established LEAP 21, the legislature
appropriated millions in state aid to fund student remediation. But the state’s
appropriations only covered 80 percent of the summer remediation for failing students.
Local school systems were required to pay 20 percent of remediation costs out of their
MFP financing (Legislative Fiscal Office, Fiscal Highlights 2000, 2000).
Another important factor in school financing is the higher rate of poverty-stricken
students in Louisiana schools (66 percent), who sometimes require extra services such as
individual tutoring, speech therapists, or vision aids to assist their cognitive development
and retention. Louisiana’s students requiring an individualized educational program
(IEP) numbered 85,119 or about 13 percent of the total student population in 2010
(National Center for Education Statistics State Education Data Profiles, 2010). To
comply with both federal and state accountability targets, the costs for educating special
populations can be dramatic. In a 2011 analysis of special education services in charter
schools in New Orleans, Bordelon (2010) found that children with disabilities were
underrepresented in charter schools due to lack of identification and resources to fund
adequate instruction. The costs associated with testing, evaluation, and accommodations
can quickly drain the resources of charter schools, which create an incentive for charters
to reclassify students or deny admission to those requiring costly services.
The state financing to local schools represent a fundamental problem in the
potential success of the LEAP in improving school quality. The LEAP demands
academically rigorous curriculum standards and high proficiency levels for testing
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performance, but schools are financed at a minimum level to support only basic operating
services. This mismatch between school financing and the expectations for student test
performance creates an uphill battle for poorer school systems to improve student
achievement on the LEAP. Local school systems fund testing and remediation costs at the
expense of other priorities that would enhance the educational environment and support
student learning. Redbud Elementary, discussed in Johnson & Johnson’s (2006) study,
lacked playground equipment, library, arts or music classes, extra-curricular academic
clubs, and basic supplies. Such gross underfunding limits those educational experiences
that would support academic and developmental growth.
A former Louisiana student, who failed the eighth grade LEAP 21 and took
summer remediation in 2001, noted how remediation did little to help students because
the school conditions were not improved,
I failed the math LEAP. A lot of people did and we had to go to summer school
for like, three weeks. It was so hot, and we had little fans in the windows. The
teachers just gave us workbooks and told us to do all the assignments to practice.
To me it was a waste of time. It would have helped if I had someone to work with
one-on-one. It wasn’t like I was dumb, I could get the right answers but just
needed help on the steps. The teachers said the tests were a lot harder because we
had to show specific steps in our answers, we couldn’t just bubble in the right
answers. I could never understand that. We have to get the right answer, but we
also have to show every single step? (O. Price, Personal communication, August
21, 2011)
The LEAP 21 increased demands for student proficiency in skill development and critical
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thinking, but there was little improvement in school environments a result of increased
financial pressures to meet accountability demands. One of implications of high stakes
testing in Louisiana is the idea that academic achievement can be increased through
classroom instruction alone, yet school facilities and the overall educational environment
is neglected. There is a resistance to funding capital improvements to schools as
evidenced by state laws that limit MFP funding to expenditures directly related to
classroom instruction.

Racial Politics
As earlier noted, Blacks first challenged BESE’s LEAP/GEE graduation policy in
a 1993 lawsuit charging discrimination against public school students. Plaintiffs sought
and won injunctive relief from the district court, but the decision was later reversed by
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1994. Black plaintiffs’ subsequent writs
of certiorari were denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court
(Johnson, 1995). Although Blacks’ test scores on the LEAP/GEE typically lagged behind
Whites, Blacks’ average test scores on the exit exam were satisfactory to pass the LEAP
tests. When the first GEE tests were administered in 1990, Whites had an average score
of 79 percent correct and Blacks had an average score of 67 percent correct (Bankston &
Caldas, 2002, p. 192). However, Blacks were 78 percent of those who could not graduate
because of failing one section of the LEAP/GEE. In 1998 Baton Rouge’s Advocate
reported that about 1500 Louisiana seniors could not graduate as a result of failing one
section of the LEAP/GEE, and these students were concentrated in New Orleans and East
Baton Rouge parishes (Myers, 1998). By 1998, when Foster announced the LEAP 21
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program and his intention to make the LEAP tests more difficult, Blacks vigorously
opposed the new promotional policy for fourth and eighth graders that would determine
student promotion solely on the results of a more difficult LEAP 21. When LEAP 21
was piloted in the 1998-1999 school year, 44,000 fourth and eighth graders failed and
would have been retained under the new policy. The next year 1999-2000, the LEAP 21
promotional requirement was instituted and 38,000 fourth and eighth graders failed one
or both portions of the LEAP 21 English/Language Arts and LEAP 21 Math (Sentell,
2000). In total, about 30 percent of Louisiana fourth-graders faced automatic retention as
result of failing one or both of the LEAP 21 sections.
Bill Quigley, then-assistant dean of the law school at Loyola University of New
Orleans, signed on as legal advisor to the New Orleans-based Parents for Educational
Justice formed in response to LEAP testing in 2000. In an interview with Times
Picayune, Quigley noted that the new LEAP 21 test for eighth graders was harder than
college admissions tests. He sent letters to then-State Superintendent Cecil Picard under
the public records law for information regarding test development, old and new copies of
LEAP tests, and names of the external contractors who developed the exam (Vaishnav,
2000). In response, House Education Committee chairman Carl Crane introduced
legislation protecting the LEAP from the public records law and a resolution was passed
exempting the LEAP from public records inspection in 2000. The following year, New
Orleans House representative Renee Gill Pratt introduced legislation making the LEAP
tests just one factor in student promotion. Again, chairman Carl Crane of the House
Education Committee killed the bill as a threat to the state’s accountability program (The
Advocate, 2001). In an interview with The Advocate explaining the racial split over the
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LEAP 21, Crane said,
The tragedy of it all is the black population is the population that will benefit the
most from high stakes testing and increased accountability in schools. (The
Advocate, 2001, p. 10)
State Superintendent Cecil Picard also felt the need to address the racial split over LEAP
testing in a bulletin released to parents in 2001 called Reaching for results: A message
from the superintendent (Louisiana Department of Education, 2001). In a “Questions and
Answers” section, criticism of the tests’ unfairness is addressed:
Q. Won’t such a difficult test be unfair to poor and minority students?
A. On the contrary, the LEAP 21 test, “high stakes” testing, and accountability
ensure that all students who need extra help get it. For many schools, that
additional help means redirecting resources to students most in need. (Louisiana
Department of Education, 2001, p. 3).
The potential benefits to Blacks were promoted by state education officials and high
ranking legislators, but many Blacks viewed the tests as a tool to weaken Black
educational progress. The frenzy to implement tougher and more comprehensive
promotional tests in Louisiana began during the desegregation period, and because of
Governor Foster’s connections to White rights groups, Blacks grew even more suspicious
of the LEAP 21 as a model for improving Black education. In an editorial response to
Crane’s comments about the benefits of LEAP 21 for Blacks, a Black lawyer from Baton
Rouge wrote to the Advocate to protest Crane’s remarks. Her impassioned response bears
the lengthy quotation,
If this test is so “crucial to the future of education reform in Louisiana,” why is it
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not given to all children in Louisiana?...It is not lost on us that the overwhelming
majority of African-American children in this state attend public schools. It is also
not lost on us that the overwhelming majority of children attending private and
parochial schools in this state are White…. Certainly no one expects us to believe
that the state of Louisiana is more concerned about African-American children
that it is about White children. If Louisiana wants to show concern for children,
we must show that we are concerned for all of our children. Administer this
wonderful, God’s gift to education, “high stakes test,” to all the children in
Louisiana, or administer it to none. (Advocate, 2002, p. 6)
Many Blacks were alarmed by the large failure rates on the LEAP 21. Blacks represented
about 52 percent of all elementary schoolchildren taking the LEAP 21 in 1999 and about
31 percent of schoolchildren in the state (Bankston & Caldas, 2002). The secrecy,
timing, and penalties associated with the LEAP fueled Blacks’ skepticism of high stakes
testing as a school excellence reform model. A former member of the 1986 LEAP testing
commission noted that a perception of racial discrimination was dismissed under the
necessity for ensuring all students possessed basic skills,
At that time we had students who could not read about a fourth-grade level, but
were passed along. I believe the LEAP, when first applied in the 1990s, served an
important purpose for measuring basic skills and I think the test was much fair.
The commission understood that a racial bias may be perceived, which is why we
took care to include a Black educator on the commission to oversee much of the
development. (I. Hays, Personal communication, August 22, 2011)
The LEAP remains a racially divisive issue in Louisiana because most of the
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punitive effects of the LEAP are felt in the Black community. Louisiana’s uneven testing
policy follows a history of public education policy that reflect racial disparities (i.e.
racially segregated schools, racially-differentiated curriculum, unequal school financing).

Conclusion
Louisiana’s early public education policy sought standardization and achievement
testing as means of assimilating the French-speaking, Catholic, and Creole population of
the early twentieth century. The state’s first achievement test was developed as a
component of the State Supervisory Program in 1921. The achievement tests were
voluntary, but encouraged by education officials as a vehicle for promoting a standard
model of curriculum and instruction in the Anglo-American tradition. The State
Supervisory Program discontinued during the Great Depression in 1933, but state interest
in both intelligence and achievement testing resurfaced during the desegregation period.
The tests became a featured component of the state’s desegregation policy, which limited
Black student enrollment to majority-White schools. Education officials touted student
testing as a way of maintaining educational quality, but the main objective was to defy
desegregation mandates. A wave of White boycotts to desegregated schools lead to
increased Black enrollment in public schools but lesser political and financial support
from state and local governments. As a result, public schools languished under financial
disinvestment and student achievement lagged behind the national average. State
legislators created the LEAP in 1986 to improve student achievement and prevent social
promotion, but the LEAP more adversely impacted Black and poorer families in
Louisiana. These groups are more adversely impacted because there is a higher
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percentage of both Black and poor students in Louisiana and specifically at the K-8 grade
level. By contrast, decisions regarding educational funding, policy, and accountability
are decided by a largely White and middle class demographic. Racial and class division
over the LEAP occurs because the middle class is concentrated in nonpublic schools that
are exempt from high stakes testing, but the poorer classes are upheld to a strict standard
of accountability.
High stakes testing in Louisiana is a factor in student promotion and graduation
for public schools only, yet there is little evidence that the high stakes testing program
has improved student achievement overall. Recent National Assessment Educational
Progress (NAEP) test scores can serve as a comparative assessment tool to monitor
changes in Louisiana’s student achievement relative to national indices. NAEP scores
indicate that Louisiana student achievement levels have remained the same since 1992. In
1992, the difference between Louisiana NAEP fourth grade reading scores versus the
national average was 11 points. In 2011, there was 10 point difference between Louisiana
fourth grade reading scores and the national average. Louisiana’s eighth grade reading
scores lagged behind the national average by 9 points in 1998, and they lagged behind the
national average by 9 points in 2011. Louisiana’s NAEP fourth grade math scores were
11 points lower than the national average in 2011, and 27 percent of students scored
below basic level. Louisiana’s NAEP eighth grade math scores were 10 points below the
national average, and there was no significant change in scores from 2009-2011. About
37 percent of Louisiana students scored below basic on the NAEP eighth grade math
assessment, and 78 percent scored at the basic level or below basic level in 2011. Recent
NAEP scores indicate that student achievement in Louisiana has consistently lagged
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behind the national average despite the intensive high stakes testing program (National
Center for Education Statistics NAEP, 2011).
A disturbing trend, however, is the drop-out rate in Louisiana that has increased
since high stakes testing was introduced. In 2009, Louisiana had the highest drop-out rate
in the country at 7.5 percent or 35,000 students (National Center for Education Statistics
Dropout Rates, 2011). The drop-out rate is a problem because it limits a large population
of Louisiana citizens to unskilled labor and fewer opportunities for socioeconomic
mobility. Because there is a higher population of poorer students in the public schools, a
situation in which tens of thousands of students drop out each year creates a cycle of
poverty for many Louisiana families. In 2011, Louisiana Public Broadcasting (2011)
aired a series called, “Dropout Dilemma: Louisiana’s Education Crisis” to investigate the
drop-out issue and highlight solutions from the Louisiana Department of Education. In a
feature story, journalists interviewed Scott Hughes as a representative of the Louisiana
thinktank Alliance for Education. Hughes stated that most Louisiana students drop-out
between grades 8 and 9 than at any other level in the K-12 system largely due to high
stakes testing. Louisiana loses more students between grades 8 and 9 than at any time
during students’ K-12 career. Why is the eighth grade LEAP test playing such a large role
in drop-out rates? It could be due to allegations made by Parents for Educational Justice
and law professor Bill Quigley, who argued that the eighth grade LEAP test is more
rigorous than college admissions tests. Quigley’s argument cannot be verified, however,
because previous and current LEAP tests are protected from public disclosure under
Louisiana state law.
The LEAP narrative presents a historical context that indicates race played a
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factor in both the social foundations and political efforts to implement the LEAP. Blacks,
who dominated public schools in New Orleans and Baton Rouge by the 1990s, saw a
dramatic increase in promotion and graduation as a result of civil rights gains and
desegregation. However, these public schools harbored a negative image by a
conservative White majority, and education officials at various levels sought to prevent
social promotion by requiring students to demonstrate competency on a standardized test.
The LEAP did not begin as a high stakes test in 1986, but punitive consequences became
increasingly associated with students’ performance under Governor Mike Foster. Foster
supervised the expansion of high stakes testing policies in LEAP 21 that resulted in
massive student failures in which thousands of students were retained or denied high
school graduation. The LEAP 21 became a racially divisive issue because of Foster’s
relationships with Whites-rights groups and the predominance of Black failures on the
test. Blacks’ suspicion of the test increased when the LEAP was shielded from public
records and review in 2000.
The current context of high stakes testing in Louisiana has expanded its focus
from student promotion and graduation to teacher evaluation and tenure. Louisiana
officials were recipients of federal 2011 Race to the Top funding that awarded grants to
states engaged in a new branch of standards-based reform (U.S. Department of Education
Race to the Top Fund, 2011). Among the goals in the Race to the Top educational reform
agenda are teacher merit pay, technology integration, data-driven instruction, and charter
school options for chronically failing public schools. All of these elements have found
some resonance in Louisiana—in particular the state’s the largest urban school district,
New Orleans Public Schools. In efforts to improve student achievement in New Orleans,
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state officials established the Recovery School District in 2006 as the largest charter
school district in the country. In the 2009-2010 school year, about 61 percent of New
Orleans students were enrolled in charter schools that operate as privately run, publiclyfunded hybrids (Fenwick, 2010). The decentralized, privatization model that currently
operates in New Orleans is now promoted as the solution to underachievement and
represents a new shift in school reform—the free market model. The free market rationale
argues that charters school operators should compete to produce the best educational
programs, thereby boosting student achievement through market-driven methods.
However, the critical issue for New Orleans is that charter school operators are
exempt from certain rules regarding teacher contracts and tenure, which has complicated
the role of New Orleans’ large Black teacher population. Prior to 2005, New Orleans was
home to the only concentration of African-American educators in the state of Louisiana.
Over 73% of the classroom teachers in New Orleans Public Schools were AfricanAmerican, and a whopping 88% of school principals and administrators were AfricanAmerican (Louisiana Department of Education, 2004). Members of the teachers union,
the United Teachers of New Orleans, were the single largest group of educated, AfricanAmerican homeowners in the city (Center for Community Change, 2006). In order to
establish the new Recovery School District, the state closed traditional public schools and
fired all New Orleans Public School employees en masse. The displaced teachers had to
reapply as new hires and satisfy new testing requirements in the Recovery School
District. In spite of earned Bachelor degrees, teaching experience, passing scores on the
state teacher examination, and a successful record of teacher certification, the teachers
had to pass a new examination initiated by the Recovery School District to screen new
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applicants. In an essay written by a veteran New Orleans teacher, the disparity in the new
testing requirements for New Orleans teachers versus other areas in Louisiana rings clear,
Many highly qualified educators are not working in the new charter schools and
the Recovery School District, because these districts are using unfair tactics to
undermine the professionalism and the respect of veteran teachers. The test that
these districts administer is an insult to the profession of teaching. Orleans Parish
is the only district in which such tests take place. In any other school district, the
state deems its certification system, which includes the national praxis exam, a
good measure for hiring teachers. (Center for Community Change, 2006, 30-31)
Second, the displaced teachers were often required to submit scores from teacher
licensing exams, record of successful teaching (as evidenced through student test scores),
and evaluations of teaching performance in the hiring process. Students’ test scores on
state exams such as the LEAP are used as the central criterion for employment and
contract renewal in many charter schools. There is a concern about the underlying
assumptions of using student test scores to evaluate teacher quality and determine teacher
pay. The LEAP narrative portrays a minimally-funded, yet high-demanding
accountability program where the punitive effects largely impact Black and poor
students. The firing of the state’s largest Black teaching population creates more poverty
and instability in the city of New Orleans that negates the success of any school reform
model. There is also a concern as to why New Orleans teachers were the only city
population summarily fired when there are other school districts throughout the state that
also reflect chronically low student achievement.
High stakes testing in Louisiana has made a strong impact on student promotion
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and graduation, but its punitive consequences have gradually intensified to include
teachers and communities. The situation in Louisiana reflects a larger trend toward
teacher accountability across the country. Teachers are increasingly judged by students’
test scores on standardized tests, although there is an abundance of research indicating
multiple factors of student achievement that include family background and school
environment (eg., Coleman, 1966; Kohn, 2000; Kozol 2006). Teachers do play an
important role in student learning, but it is problematic to apply the accountability matrix
to teacher pay, evaluation, and tenure. A report from the Educational Commission of the
States (2010) reviewed four merit pay initiatives in school districts across the U.S.:
Denver, Texas, Chicago, and Iowa. Investigators found there was no difference in student
achievement between those participating in the merit pay program and those that did not.
Despite this admission by the Educational Commission of the States, merit pay initiatives
have begun in many states across the country, and are defended by the free market
rationale of school reform that promotes competition and incentives to schools and
teachers. However, as indicated by the history of the LEAP, there are social, racial, and
economic subtexts within school reform discourse that complicate high stakes testing
programs and their intended goals. Further research concerning the LEAP and similar
high stakes testing programs is warranted to investigate larger implications on
employment, poverty, school improvement, racial equality, and community progress.
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